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INTRODUCTION
The last decade of the twentieth century has seen a sharp increase in
the number of new states, many of them a result of the end of the Cold
War and the demise of European communism.' Not since decolonization
have sovereignty and self-determination been such powerful currencies
* Associate Director, Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School; Visiting Professor,
University of Puerto Rico School of Law (Summer 1995). S.J.D. (1987), L.L.M. (1985),
Harvard Law School; L.L.M. (1984), L.L.B. (1983), University of Dar-es-salaam. The author
wishes to thank Athena Mutua, James Gathii, Susan Ruth Marks, Henry Richardson III,
Henry Steiner, John Witte, Jr., and Joe Oloka-Onyango for their valuable comments. The
author dedicates this article to his late parents, Rose Ndui Mutua and Joseph Mutua, whose
lives were needlessly and prematurely lost in December 1992. Without them, the author
would not have been free, nor would he have understood the meaning of freedom.
1. The break-up of the Soviet Union, for example, created fifteen separate, independent,
and sovereign states: Armenia, Azerbaydzhan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan. East Germany was absorbed by West Germany. In a first for post-colonial Africa,
Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia and in 1993 became an independent state. Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia and Montenegro, or what is sometimes referred to
as rump Yugoslavia, have arisen from the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. For a
journalistic account of the recent creation of ministates through the break-up of larger entities,
see Russell W. Howe, Countries are Breaking into Ministates and That's Not Necessarily
Bad, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 23, 1994, at E8.
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in international discourse.2 Now the protracted problems of the post-
colonial African state have raised anew the meaning of state legitimacy
and brought forward disturbing questions about the concepts of territori-
al sovereignty and statehood.3 The juridical statehood attained with the
decolonization of the colonial state has in the last four decades proven
inadequate.4 It is becoming increasingly apparent that these concepts and
principles may have trapped Africa in a detrimental time capsule; they
now seem to be straightjackets with timebombs ready to explode. The
imposition of the nation-state through colonization balkanized Africa
into ahistorical units and forcibly yanked it into the Age of Europe,5
2. Since 1945 the world has witnessed the rejection, normatively and practically, of
colonialism and other forms of foreign occupation and control. Self-determination is now
firmly established as a right exercisable by peoples under international law. The work of the
United Nations in this regard has been instrumental. The United Nations Charter provides, in
part, that one of the purposes of the United Nations is "[t]o develop friendly relations among
nations based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of
peoples." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 2. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples provides, in part, that "[aill peoples have the right to self-
determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their own political status." The
resolution proclaimed "the necessity of bringing a speedy and unconditional end to colonial-
ism in all its forms and manifestations." Id. at 67. This declaration, which became the basis
for massive decolonization, starting, in effect, the so-called Independence Decade, was
complemented by G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc.
A/4651 (1961). Common Article One of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. ExEc. Doc. D, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978), 99
U.N.T.S. 171, 173, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5, provide that: "All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."
3. International law, or the rules and principles governing relations between organized
political societies, evolved throughout history and predates the domination of the world by
European states in the last five centuries. But during that period, a cluster of European states
has taken over the formulation of the major doctrines of international law, including the
concepts of statehood and sovereignty, and provided them with specific legal meanings in the
law of nations. As an example, today, "[under international law, a state is an entity that has
a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and
that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 201 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see
generally LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 241-308 (3d
ed. 1993). Statehood is not possible without the effective control of a specific identifiable
territorial area. Id. at 246-48.
4. Political independence was not followed by economic independence. A hostile global
economy marginalized Africa and contributed to the failure of the post-colonial state. See
Thandika Mkandawire, 30 Years of African Independence: the Economic Experience, in 30
YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA: THE LOST DECADES? 86, 98-101 (Peter Anyang'
Nyong'o ed., 1992) [hereinafter 30 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE].
5. I use the term "Age of Europe" to denote a historical and philosophical paradigm; that
of European hegemony imposed over the globe, particularly the South, over the last five
centuries, culminating in the domination of the Americas, Africa, and parts of Asia by
Western European norms and forms in the fields of government, religion, society, culture, and
the economy.
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permanently disfiguring it.6 Unlike their European counterparts, African
states and borders are distinctly artificial and are not "'the visible ex-
pression of the age-long efforts of [the indigenous] peoples to achieve
political adjustment between themselves and the physical conditions in
which they live.' "' Colonization interrupted that historical and evolu-
tionary process. Since then Africa has attempted, often unsuccessfully,
to live up to and within these new formulations; all too frequently the
consequences have been disastrous. 8
The problems of the modem African state have been well document-
ed,9 with some analyses bordering on the apocalyptic.'0 Whatever the
6. Most African states are the products of the competitive subjugation of the continent by
Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and Spain between 1875-1900. Of
the current states only Botswana, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco,
Rwanda, Swaziland, and Tunisia have any meaningful pre-colonial territorial and political
identity. The rest, including these, were either partitioned or bounded by the expediency of
colonization. See Crawford Young, The Heritage of Colonialism, in AFRICA IN WORLD
POLITICS 19 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothschild eds., 1991) [hereinafter AFRICA IN
WORLD POLITICS]. The power to define and exclude territory was not confined to internal
map-making. Mazrui points out, for example, that it was "Europeans who decided that the
western side of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal was indeed Africa while the eastern side was
not." ALl A. MAZRUI, THE AFRICANS: A TRIPLE HERITAGE 101 (1986). He states, matter-of-
factly, that "what we regard as Africa today is primarily what Europeans decided was Africa."
Id. Even the term "Africa" and its derivatives, such as "African" are not indigenous to the
continent; they, like the colonial state, are European impositions.
7. J.C. ANENE, THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES OF NIGERIA 1885-1960, at 3 (1970)
(quoting A.E. Moodie, Fragmented Europe, in THE CHANGING WORLD: STUDIES IN POLITI-
CAL GEOGRAPHY 37, 54 (W. Gordon East & A.E. Moodie eds., 1956)).
8. Severe cleavages, those which have been a major source of the persistent problem of
the African state, are the direct result of the imposition of colonial rule and the modern state.
Ethnic rivalries have arisen because previously independent and self-governing ethno-political
nations, characterized in almost all cases by cultural, linguistic, and ethnic homogeneity, have
been coerced to live together under single states. Religious tensions, and their politicization,
are the products of the proselytizing rivalries of Islam and Christianity. As Mazrui aptly
notes, "[it] is arguable that Africa did not have religious wars before the arrival of Christiani-
ty and Islam." Ali A. Mazrui, Africa and Other Civilizations: Conquest & Counterconquest,
in AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 6, at 69, 77.
9. For a catalogue of human rights abuses by African governments, see, for example,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1994 (1994); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1994 (1993); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1995
(1994); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 104TH CONG., lST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994: REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
U.S. SENATE AND THE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Joint
Comm. Print 1995).
10. One of the most bone-chilling and pessimistic accounts of Africa, present and future,
has been offered by Kaplan. Although his horrific analysis of the disintegration, decay, and
the inevitable collapse of Africa has been standard diet in the West since the first Christian
missionaries landed in Africa, it is done in an idiom so revolting that it is searing in its
absolute pessimism. Seen through his eyes, governments implode, disease and environmental
degradation take over, and civil and ethnic strife end life on the continent. See Robert D.
Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 44; see also, Matthew
Connelly & Paul Kennedy, Must It be the Rest Against the West?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec.
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severity of the prediction, it is undeniable that the survival of Africa is
seriously threatened by corrupt and inept political elites, unbridled
militaries, ethnic rivalries and conflicts, refugee flows, and economic
misery. These have become chronic crises from which deliverance
seems unlikely. As if to bear out the prophets of doom, the post-colonial
state has recently collapsed in Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia." Others,
such as Zaire, Nigeria, Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, and
Kenya maintain a precarious balance on the political precipice. I argue
in this Article that the post-colonial state, the uncritical successor of the
colonial state, is doomed because it lacks basic moral legitimacy. Its
normative and territorial construction on the African colonial state, itself
a legal and moral nullity, is the fundamental reason for its failure. I
argue that, at independence, the West decolonized the colonial state, not
the African peoples subject to it. In other words, the right to self-deter-
mination was exercised not by the victims of colonization but their
victimizers, the elites who control the international state system. As
1994, at 61. (discussing economic and demographic disparities between rich and poor
countries); Scott Peterson, Africa's Hopes Die Amid the Agony of War, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Dec. 29, 1994, at 13, available in NEXIS, World Library, Telegr File (listing
recent African tragedies).
11. The failure of the Liberian, Somali, and Rwandese states was spurred partially by the
refusal or reluctance of dominant cliques, which are drawn from particular clans or ethnic
groups, to allow popular political participation. The Liberian state, formed by the United
States and long run according to U.S. interests, collapsed in 1990 after a coup by Samuel
Doe, a military dictator supported and armed by the United States for most of his checkered
and brutal rule. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LIBERIA: A PROMISE BETRAYED 12-17
(1986); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION'S RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1988, at 116-20 (1989). The country has
become ungovernable as military factions, drawn from diverse ethnicities, have battled for
control. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1993, at 191-93
(1993); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990: REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
U.S. SENATE AND THE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 192-202
(Joint Comm. Print 1991).
The gross human rights abuses and the intransigence of Mohamed Siad Barre, the late
Somali despot, to enter into peace negotiations with rebel forces clamoring for political
participation led to the breakup of the state in 1991. A United Nations peacekeeping force left
the country in 1995 after its failure to re-establish either civil or viable government. See
AFRICA WATCH, SOMALIA: A GOVERNMENT AT WAR WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE (1990); AMNES-
TY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 9, 262--64.
Rwanda has been engaged in a quest for more open government ever since its coloniza-
tion by Belgium. The minority Tutsi population, which has been struggling for a voice in the
Hutu-dominated government, finally captured state power in 1994 under the leadership of the
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans, mainly Tutsi, were
massacred by the retreating Hutu forces. Many more Hutus, by some estimates several
million, fled to refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania. See GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: BACK-
GROUND AND CURRENT SITUATION (Napoleon Abdulabi ed., 1994); Makau wa Mutua, U.N.
must make Rwanda a priority, OAKLAND TRIB., May 25, 1994, at A13.
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such, dependence continued under the post-colonial state, the instrument
of narrow elites and their international backers. I concede that although
other reasons, such as external economic factors and cultural disorienta-
tion, have contributed to the crisis of the African state, they cannot be
divorced from the crisis of internal legitimacy. I contend that foreign
imposition of artificial states and their continued entrapment within the
concepts of statehood and sovereignty are sure to occasion the extinction
of Africa unless those sacred cows are set aside for now to disassemble
African states and reconfigure them. I propose that pre-colonial entities
within the post-colonial order be allowed to exercise their right to self-
determination. Only this radical but necessary step can legitimize the
African state and avoid its demise.'
2
Needless to say, my surgical suggestion, that of new cartography,
13
will doubtless be viewed without sympathy by a host of interested
parties: elites who control the international state and financial systems,
scholars stuck in traditional notions of international law, and states
elsewhere. But nowhere is opposition bound to be steeper than within
12. By redrawing Africa's map, I do not mean just the physical delineation of land mass,
although that is a necessary part of the process of recreating the African state. I also mean the
reconceptualization of the state and its relationship to the individual and society. Here, one
can imagine various constitutional and legal devices, such as constitutionalism or other
conceptions of limited government, that are essential for the creation of a democratic state. In
addition, any successful rebirth of African statehood must redefine the state's relationship
with dominant global forces such as multinational corporations and international finance
institutions in such a way that the state recaptures its sovereignty. Finally, such a process
must pay attention to African political and cultural heritage if it is to attain any legitimacy
with broad sectors of the people.
13. As an example of a new African political map, I have conceived a sketch that could
serve as the basis for such a discussion. I offer the map not as a definitive or final solution
but merely as a suggested road map and a starting point for more rigorous analyses on what
a new map might look like and how it might be put together. Although my map compresses
the 50-odd states in Africa today to only 14 larger entities, I want to emphasize that the
eventual map should be arrived at through voluntary association and disassociation of pre-
colonial entities, taking into account historical circumstances; population density; resources
and economic viability; and cultural, ethnic, and geographic variables. In the new map, the
Republic of Kusini, Kiswahili for "south" takes in South Africa, Namibia, Zimababwe,
Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, and Botswana. The new Egypt combines Egypt
and Arabic Sudan while. Nubia would bring together southern Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania. Somalia would be beefed up by Djibouti, the Ogaden province of Ethiopia, and
Kenya's northern province, all areas inhabited by Somalis. Mali, named for the ancient
empire, swallows up Mali, African (black) Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia,
the Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. Congo would combine Zaire, Congo, Burundi,
the Central African Republic, and Rwanda while Ghana, another ancient kingdom, would
consist of Ghana, Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea,
and Sao Tome and Principe. Benin, named for the kingdom, would take in Chad, Burkina
Faso, and Niger. Algeria and Angola remain the same but Libya and Tunisia become one.
Morocco, Arabic Mauritania, and Western Sahara become Sahara. Finally, Kisiwani combines
Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and the Comoros. For more on the new map, see Makau
wa Mutua, Redrawing the map along African lines, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 22, 1994, at 17
[hereinafter Mutua, Redrawing the Map]. The map is reproduced on the previous page.
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African states themselves and the ruling cliques who benefit from those
states. Until Eritrea's recent success in its secessionist war against
Ethiopia, prevailing state ideology in Africa treated as treason any
discussion about border changes, separatist movements, or ethnic self-
determination within an independent African state. Ironically, it was
African elites who sanctified the colonial state by ratifying its borders
and forbidding even idle speculation about reconsideration of the issue.
Even where European map-makers split one nation in two states, such as
the division of the Masai between Kenya and Tanzania, the fate of the
people was discussed as though they were two separate and alien enti-
ties, in defiance of reality on the ground. Even today, with overwhelm-
ing empirical evidence of the failure of the post-colonial state, African
elites insist on clinging to this fiction of European creation to the bitter
end. Cases in point are the regime of Siad Barre of Somalia, Samuel
Doe of Liberia, and Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda who, rather than
permit independent political activity, instead defied popular demands,
leading to the collapse of their states. 4 Similar fate most likely awaits a
host of others: Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire,
Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, and many more.
There are several reasons for this resistance to an imagination of
political life without the post-colonial state. The simple explanation is
that alienated elites - who have more in common with and harbor
aspirations of elites in industrialized countries than with their teeming
masses of rural and urban poor - are loathe to give up the privileges
which come from control of the state. Since their lavish lifestyle stems
from the state as organized, it would be suicidal for the leaders to
participate in changing it. Even when the state is not effective - or on
the brink of collapse - elites will still defend it. Arguments against
dismantling the colonial state range from the "chaos" that would result
from removing central authority to the balkanization of Africa into a
million ethnic entities. While anti-colonial fervor had a lot to do with
pride in the post-colonial state, unless the sobering reality of its failure
is appreciated and steps are taken to make a voluntary, consensual map,
the partition of Africa into small, Eritrea-like states, or possibly smaller
ones, is inevitable. That eventuality will come at a great cost to Africa
and it is not in the interest of the continent. That is why I argue in this
article for an orderly recreation of the state.
14. See supra note 11.
Summer 1995] 1119
Michigan Journal of International Law
I. THE COLONIAL STATE: A MORAL AND LEGAL NULLITY?
The concepts of sovereignty and statehood, as developed and used
in traditional international law by a handful of European powers, were
historically crafted without pre-colonial Africa in mind. 5 Yet it is
precisely these concepts which have been the basis for the creation of
scores of modern states in Africa. For many centuries, international law
was regarded as the law existing between "civilized" states.' 6 Though
today it is the main currency regulating international relations, interna-
tional law or the law of nations is a development out of exclusively
European historical circumstances. 7 Similarly, this exclusive body of
15. The underlying concepts of political autonomy and territorial integrity among African
political and state formations existed in the pre-colonial era. The inviolability of community
territory, the exclusivity of participation in the political and social processes of the community
by its members, and the integrity of the community were fiercely protected in the pre-colonial
era. Trade relations with other communities took place on these basic premises. Some of the
more rigidly stratified and centralized societies had extensive dealings with outsiders. These
concepts, though in some respects similar to European notions, arose out of a different
historical milieu and were not a result of commercialization and the expansionist ethos of the
European state. A form of inter-state discourse, an international law, existed before the
colonization of Africa, but it did not exhibit the predatory nature of European "international
law," although powerful states conquered weaker entities to consolidate their kingdoms. Elias
has noted inter-state relations in Africa and between African and Arab states between
300-1500 A.D. In the 13th century, for example, Mansa Musa, the ruler of the Mandingo
kingdom of Mali traded regularly with Arab states. See T.O. ELIAS, AFRICA AND THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-15 (1988).
16. James Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, 48 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 93, 98 (1976-77). The British regarded international law as only the province of
"Christian nations." Id. (quoting I HERBERT ARTHUR SMITH, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE LAW
OF NATIONS 12 (1932)). "Members of the society whose law was international were the
European states between whom it evolved from the fifteenth century onwards, and those other
States accepted expressly or tacitly by the original members into the Society of Nations; for
example the United States and Turkey." Id. According to Umozurike, an African professor of
international law, a few powerful European states "arrogated to themselves the circle of the
civilised world" at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Turkey was not admitted into this
exclusive club until 1856 and Japan only after it defeated China in 1901-02. China was itself
admitted thereafter. U.O. UMOZURIKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-10 (1993).
17. Oppenheim, one of the most distinguished writers on the subject, states that interna-
tional law "is in its origin essentially a product of Christian civilisation" which arose in the
second half of the Middle Ages. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 4
(Arnold D. McNair ed., 4th ed. 1928). Working from natural law, seventeenth century writers
such as Hugo Grotius constructed a body of rules on "religious, moral, rational, and histori-
cal" bases; these rules are now the foundation of modern international law. Id. at 19.
Pomeroy, another writer, traces international law to Christian morality and to God's en-
dowment of man with "universal conscience and intellect" to "discern and approve great and
abstract principles of right, truth, and justice" from which "a perfect system of positive law"
could be built to rid society of evil. Termed jus gentium by their authors, the Roman jurists,
these rules initially governed only relations between Roman citizens and foreigners; today
they inform many international law principles. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, LECTURES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIME OF PEACE 4-5 (Theodore Salisbury Woolsey ed., 1886).
According to Oppenheim, a number of factors paved the way for the development of the
law of nations: the increase in sea trade and the need for maritime law; the need for protec-
1120 [Vol. 16:1113
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law has identified the sources from which it may be derived as custom,
treaty, general principles of law common to all major legal systems, and
the judicial decisions and the teachings of highly regarded publicists
from different countries.' 8
Given this history, the legality of the colonial state can be assessed
from both inside and outside the discourse and paradigm of international
law. From the inside, a critical evaluation of colonization could indicate
whether it was a violation of the European norms and practice of the
rules of extant inter-state discourse. Whatever the case, the outcome has
a bearing on the legality of the colonial state itself. Legality could also
be assessed from the exterior, looking at colonization from the vantage
point of the colonized, in the seat of those subjected to European impe-
rial rule and expansionism. The question of the legality and legitimacy
of the colonial state is critical because it deeply implicates the moral and
legal character of its successor, the post-colonial state. In revisiting the
nature of the colonial and the post-colonial state, I do not question, or
intend to undermine, the principle of decolonization as a norm or prac-
tice of international law, a trajectory implied by some recent writers.' 9
tion of inter-state trade; the development of the art of diplomacy or the exchange of delega-
tions; need to craft rules governing warfare because of the permanence of the standing army
and the ravages of the Thirty Years' War; and the end, because of Renaissance and Reforma-
tion, of the spiritual leadership of the Pope over Europe and his right to act as the arbiter of
inter-state conflicts, especially those between Protestant and Catholic states. OPPENHEIM,
supra, at 63-66.
18. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the premier authority
on the sources of international law, provides:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38.
The Restatement also provides an almost identical list of the sources of international law.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 102. Oppenheim, an earlier writer, regarded custom and
treaties the "two exclusive sources of the Law of Nations." OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 27.
Pomeroy, an even more ancient writer, adds to these "divine law:" the principles of morality
as "revealed" in "God's written word" or in the "consciousness of mankind," and reason.
POMEROY, supra note 16, at 25.
19. Mazrui, the acclaimed Kenyan academic, recently argued for the recolonization of
Africa because of the "successive collapse of the state in one African country after another."
1121Summer 1995]
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But I make the argument that decolonization was not the same thing as
liberation. My purpose is to attempt the discovery of formulae through
which the complete independence, sovereignty, and the viability and
prosperity of African political societies could be secured.
A. The Criteria for Statehood: A Recipe for Colonization
I need not emphasize the point that although African states, like
states elsewhere, subscribe to international law, none of them were
involved in its making prior to decolonization. The only possible excep-
tions are Ethiopia and Liberia. Ethiopia, an ancient African kingdom,
was recognized as a sovereign and independent power by Europeans and
Americans in the nineteenth century. 20 Liberia enjoyed recognition from
European imperial powers because of its special relationship to the
United States.2' The two were the only African states to engage in
Ali Mazrui, The Message of Rwanda: Recolonize Africa?, NEW PEESP. Q., Fall 1994, at 18.
Recolonization under the banner of humanitarianism, he proposed, could arrest the spread of
the cancer of chaos seen in Somalia. To distinguish his version of colonization from that of
the European powers, Mazrui envisioned an African Security Council composed of five
pivotal African states - Egypt, Ethiopia, Zaire, South Africa, and Nigeria - coordinating
with the United Nations to reestablish peace and order. Id. at 18-20; Ali Mazrui, Maybe the
Time has Come to Recolonize Africa, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 3, 1994, at A27. Mazrui had
warned earlier that a new trusteeship system, a disguised recolonization, was being tried under
the pretext of peacekeeping in Somalia and Liberia. He urged Africans to create their own
mechanisms, a Pax Africana, to restore order to troubled countries on the continent. Tsegaye
Tadesse, Beware Recolonisation, Academic Tells Africa, REUTER LIR. REP., May 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. At least one notable American commentator
has made a direct appeal to Europeans to retake Africa to save it from itself. William Pfaff,
Africa Needs Europe to Get Involved Again in a Different Spirit, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Aug.
15, 1994 [hereinafter Pfaff, Africa Needs Europe]. Pfaff implies in the article that Europeans
may have departed too soon without properly "civilizing" Africa. Id. The not-too-subtle
suggestion is that decolonization was a mistake. See also William Pfaff, A New Colonialism?,
74 FOREIGN Arr. Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 2-6 [hereinafter Pfaff, A New Colonialism]. Pfaff's
position, which is patently racist, is inexplicable because he does not explain why he thinks
that Europeans, who are responsible for the African crisis, would be better "recolonizers," or
why and whether they would want to re-occupy Africa.
20. The only African state to escape colonization and the Scramble for Africa, although
it was briefly occupied by Italy from 1936-41, was Ethiopia. France, Great Britain, and Italy
recognized Ethiopian sovereignty between 1898 and 1907, and made agreements to that
effect. See IAN BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES: A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC
ENCYCLOPAEDIA 775 (1979) [hereinafter BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES]. It is important
to note, though, that some colonial states had diplomatic and commercial intercourse with
European states. For example, in 1514, the Oba [king] of Benin sent envoys to Portugal to
procure arms. ELIAS, supra note 15, at 11.
21. Liberia owes its existence to American whites who formed the American Coloniza-
tion Society whose purpose was to repatriate freed African slaves to Africa. With the encour-
agement of President James Monroe, for whom Monrovia, the capital of Liberia was named,
a group of freedmen and whites landed in the territory in 1822 and took over land for
settlement from local peoples. Their community, ruled first by whites on behalf of the
Colonization Society and later by freedmen, declared itself the independent Republic of
Liberia in 1847. The colonists in effect subjected the entire native population, which constitut-
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international relations or to participate or be present at fora in which
international law was being developed.
In this segment, I briefly outline the exclusivity of the process of the
development of the law relating to statehood to lay the basis for a
demonstration of how those norms were conveniently manipulated and
violated by their authors in the "Scramble for Africa." The discussion
about the criteria for the determination of statehood and the rights and
duties attached to sovereignty illustrates how a few select nations,
primarily because of superior military power, held the monopoly over
which peoples and societies could retain control over their affairs.
In the seventeenth century, when modern colonialism became a
practice of European states, international law governed only relations
between "civilized" European nations. These states were defined by the
basic attributes of formal juridical equality, independence and sovereign-
ty, a fixed locality or territory, and a political society organized into a
government.22 A state proper was not possible without a people, country,
government, and a sovereign or supreme authority.23 States are different
from governments; the latter, whose life is limited, govern the former,
whose lifespan is perpetual.24 During the nineteenth century, however,
how an entity became a state was a "matter of no importance;" recogni-
tion, .a "juristic baptism," was the only agency of admission into "civi-
lized" society, a rite of passage that triggered duties and rights under
international law.25 The mode of acquisition of territory or their relations
with others before entities were recognized as states were irrelevant.
26
The law of the jungle, or survival of the fittest, was the basis on which
international recognition was achieved.
The criteria for the existence of statehood, and its critical relation-
ship to the act of recognition, has been developed on this basis in cur-
rent international law. When questions arise, as they often do, about
ed 97% of Liberian citizens, to its rulership. See SANFORD J. UNGAR, AFRICA: THE PEOPLE
AND POLITICS OF AN EMERGING CONTINENT 89-93 (1985).
22. POMEROY, supra note 17, at 48-51.
23. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 135. Such states were proper international persons.
The capacity of an entity to enter into relations with other states, and to possess rights and
duties, is an important attribute of statehood as well. See HENKIN, supra note 3, at 228-29.
For Friedmann, states are "the repositories of legitimated authority over peoples and territo-
ry." WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 213
(1964).
24. While an independent government is a requirement of statehood, governments and
regimes come and go and the international community has to decide whether a particular
government is the government for the state in question. See HENKIN, supra note 3, at 230.
25. Crawford, supra note 16, at 98.
26. Id. at 99.
Summer 1995] 1123
Michigan Journal of International Law
whether an entity is a state," two contradictory theories of recognition
almost always come into focus. In early international law certain Euro-
pean states, the "original members" of the family of nations because
they made the law through custom and treaties, did not need recognition
to become states. The same was true of states that these original mem-
bers had recognized. For new states recognition was mandatory.28 Thus
a "State is, and becomes, an International Person through recognition
only and exclusively."'29 This view, named the constitutive theory,
asserted that only the act of recognition could confer international
personality on an entity purporting to be a state; the act of recognition
by other states effectively "constituted" or "created" the new state.
3
0
Without recognition, an entity could not enjoy the rights of sovereignty
and was therefore vulnerable to foreign occupation.3'
In contrast, the declaratory theory holds that the existence of a state
depended primarily on whether facts showed that an entity met the
criteria for statehood set out under international law. Thus, a state could
exist without recognition; recognition only and merely serves to "de-
clare" that a state existed.32 The basic function of recognition was to
"acknowledge the fact of the state's political existence and to declare the
recognizing state's willingness to treat the entity as an international
27. Questions of statehood or whether an entity is a state arise in one of the following
circumstances: secession, or an attempt thereof, from and by part of a territory of an existing
state; situations in which foreign control is exercised over the policies or affairs of a state
entity through treaty, unilateral imposition, or delegated authority; where two or more states
form a political union but retain considerable autonomy; where constituent units of federated
states claim attributes of statehood; in cases where territorial or non-territorial communities
with a special international status through a treaty or customary law claim statehood. See
HENKIN, supra note 3, at 229-30. Most claims of statehood by colonial entities would be
covered under the second category, that of the foreign control over the affairs of another state
through unilateral imposition.
28. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 143.
29. Id.
30. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 231. Though Oppenheim, a leading proponent of the
constitutive theory, conceded that recognition was different from statehood, he nevertheless
inextricably linked them. He argued that recognition was necessary to confer rights and duties
and the ability to enter into relations with other states. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 142-45.
Lauterpacht, another prominent proponent of this view, argued that the "full international
personality of rising communities" cannot be "automatic"; that someone, in this case existing
states since there is no permanent international body set up for that purpose, must perform the
task of determining if an entity is an international personality. See H. LAUTERPACHT, REcoG-
NITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1947).
31. See generally OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 448-57.
32. See HENKIN, supra note 3, at 231. Within the declaratory theory, according to
Crawford, "recognition of new States is a political act which is in principle independent of the
existence of the new State as a full subject of international law." Crawford, supra note 16, at
103.
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person, with the rights and obligations of a state. 33 Many entities,
including pre-colonial societies in Africa, should have been left alone on
the basis of this theory. 34 Although there is no duty to recognize under
international law, state practice now favors the requirement that an
entity be treated as a state if it attains the qualifications of statehood,
unless it has done so in violation of international law.35 In state practice,
judicial authority, and legal opinion, the declaratory theory has prevailed
over the constitutive theory.36
These criteria of statehood, 37 particularly as applied at an earlier
period, were crafted to preserve the sovereignty of European states -
and the few others they blessed - and to regulate intercourse among
them. The constitutive theory of recognition could be an especially
convenient tool for interference in the affairs of other political societies.
By the same token, the declaratory theory could be a basis for an argu-
ment for the illegality of colonization, since an entity need not have
been recognized to become a state. By arrogating to themselves the right
to determine, by recognition, when an entity could be considered a state,
European powers apparently left an opening for the legalization of
colonization or the takeover of entities they coveted. Territories which
they did not recognize as states or those which had not been admitted
into the family of nations could be coerced into surrendering part or all
of their autonomy. Several questions are raised by this view, including
the validity of the universalization by Europeans of their particular
norms on the conditions which a political society had to fulfill to earn
the right to be left alone. Why, for example, did other peoples and
societies have to lose their independence and their right to self-determi-
nation simply because they did not meet the requirements for statehood
as developed in Europe? As the experience of colonization in Africa
will demonstrate, it mattered little even when pre-colonial societies met
33. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 231.
34. For example, a British expedition captured the ancient state of Benin in 1897
although Benin had diplomatic contact with Portugal as early as 1514. ELIAS, supra note 14,
at 11-13.
35. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 202.
36. For example, the authoritative Institut de Droit International stated in 1936 that:
"[T]he existence of a new state with all the legal consequences attaching to this existence is
not affected by the refusal of recognition by one or more states." INSTITUT DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL, 2 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INT'L 300 (1936). Other international
instruments and institutions concur. E.g., Inter-American Convention on Rights and Duties,
Dec. 26, 1933, art. 3, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100; Charter of the Organization of American States,
Apr. 30, 1948, art. 3, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 52, amended by Protocol of Amendment, 21 U.S.T.
607; HENKIN, supra note 3, at 231.
37. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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the criteria for statehood, as many did; all but Liberia and Ethiopia
became possessions of European states.
B. Colonization: Problems of Law, Morality, and Process
There is no disagreement over the motives for the colonization of
Africa; commentators agree on its economic basis. 38 The first serious
contacts between Europe and Africa involved the capture of African
slaves for the newly-discovered Americas. Portugal, and later other
European powers including the British and the French, captured and
transported for sale millions of Africans into the New World.39 But
European occupationist designs over the continent did not mature until
the mid-1800s. The tremendous growth of western European capitalism
and the need for markets and materials for industry gave urgency to
imperialism.' The scramble began with the sudden French invasion of
Algeria in 1830, the British takeover of Egypt and the Suez Canal, King
Leopold's seizure of large tracts in central Africa, and Germany's ambi-
38. According to a reputable Africanist,
Africa, in the rhetorical metaphor of imperial jingoism, was a ripe melon awaiting
carving in the late nineteenth century. Those who scrambled fastest won the largest
slices and the right to consume at their leisure the sweet, succulent flesh. Stragglers
snatched only small servings or tasteless portions; Italians, for example, found only
deserts on their plates.
Young, supra note 6, at 19; see generally ROLAND OLIVER, THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
(1991). For a detailed and historical account of the detrimental effects of European penetra-
tion of Africa, see WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (1981).
39. Portugal was the oldest established power in Africa and had for many centuries been
a slave-trader. S.E. CROWE, THE BERLIN WEST AFRICAN CONFERENCE 11 (1970). For a fuller
account of the European trade in African slaves, see generally BASIL DAVIDSON, AFRICA IN
HISTORY (1991) [hereinafter DAVIDSON, HISTORY].
40. JACK WODDIs, AN INTRODUCTION TO NEO-COLONIALISM 13-14 (1967). Colonialists,
such as Cecil Rhodes, for whom the defunct Rhodesia was named, encouraged European
states to "underwrite imperial enterprise beyond the seas." DAVIDSON, HISTORY, supra note
39, at 283. He justified colonization in this classic passage:
I was in the East End of London [a working class quarter] yesterday and attended
a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry
for 'bread,' bread,' bread,' and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I
became more and more convinced of the importance of imperialism ... My
cherished idea as a solution to the social problem, i.e., in order to save the
40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial
statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new
markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have
always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you
must become imperialists.
Die Neue Zeit, XVI, 1, at 304 quoted in V.I. LENIN, IMPERIALISM: THE HIGHEST STAGE OF
CAPITALISM 96-97 (1947) (emphasis added).
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tion to acquire colonies of its own.41 The Berlin colonial conference,
labelled the West African Conference and disguised as a forum for the
liberalization and internationalization of trade in Africa, purported to
legalize the partition and subordination of the continent to European
states.42 Needless to say, none of the African peoples or political entities
who were the subject of the conference were invited to provide their
view of the legality of colonization or, put differently, the loss of sover-
eignty over their societies. The Europeans felt that they knew what was
best for the natives.43 The orderly division of Africa was meant to
defuse colonial tensions and avoid the risk of.war among the conferees.
Morally, the justification for colonization was steeped in European
racism, a continuing theme in African-European or black-white relations
over the centuries, started in the fifteenth century with arrival of European
explorers, Christian missionaries, and slave traders in Africa in the fifteenth
century.' In the early nineteenth century, an intellectual discourse about
the "natural" and "inherent superiority of 'white' peoples over 'black'
peoples" gained popularity and acceptance.45 According to Davidson:
41. DAVIDSON, HISTORY, supra note 39, at 283-84.
42. See generally CROWE, supra note 39. The 1885 conference was attended by the
United States and all powers in Europe except Switzerland, for a total of 14 states. Id. at 5.
At the end of the conference, the powers present signed a treaty, the General Act of the
Conference of Berlin, Feb. 26, 1885, giving legal effect to claims of different powers and
recognizing their territories in Africa. 'The Act also set out the conditions for effective
occupation and the procedures to be followed in the event of future acquisitions or possession
of territories on the continent. Id. at 190.
43. The only non-white state at the conference was China. ELIAS, supra note 15, at 20.
44. Some missionaries, for example, believed in the innate inferiority of Africans. For
example, one missionary to the Bantu people wrote that
the mere possession on the part of the Bantu (the African peoples of east and southern
Africa] of nothing but an oral tradition of culture. creates a chasm of difference
between the Native "mind" and that of civilized man, and of itself would account for
a lack of balance and proportion in the triple psychological function of feeling,
thinking and acting, implying that thinking is the weakest of the three and that feeling
is the most dominant.
DENYS SHROPSHIRE, THE CHURCH AND PRIMITIVE PEOPLES xix (1938). Elsewhere, he notes
that Africans, a "primitive people," have not developed a "sovereignty of reason." Id. at xiii.
Another asserted that the mission to Africa was the "least that we [Europeans] can do to strive
to raise him [the African] in the scale of mankind." A.H. BARROW, FIrV YEARS IN WEST
AFRICA 29 (1900). Davidson calls racism the moral justification for colonialism and defines it
as "the conscious and systematic weapon of domination, of exploitation, which first saw its
demonic rise with the onset of the trans-Atlantic trade in African captives sold into slavery, and
which, later, led on to the imperialist colonialism of our yesterdays." BASIL DAVIDSON, AFRICAN
CIVILIZATION REVISITED 3 (1991) [hereinafter DAVIDSON, CIVILIZATION].
45. This doctrine of white superiority was at odds with previous European scholarship. That
scholarship knew that the foundations of European civilization derived from classical
Greek civilization. That scholarship further accepted what the Greeks had laid down
as patently obvious: that classical Greek civilization derived, in its religion, its
philosophy, its mathematics and much else, from the ancient civilizations of Africa,
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The advocates of this discourse - Hegel [German philosopher
Georg Hegel] most typically, but duly followed by a host of
'justifiers' - declared that Africa had no history prior to direct
contact with Europe. Therefore the Africans, having made no
history of their own, had clearly made no development of their
own. Therefore they were not properly human, and could not be
left to themselves but must be 'led' towards civilization by other
peoples: that is, by the peoples of Europe, especially of western
Europe, and most particularly of Britain and France.'
Combined with the insular development of international law as the
exclusive domain of Christian nations, such discourse served as fodder
for states ready to expand for economic reasons; it certainly added to
the zealotry for colonization.47 Early international legal doctrine itself
appeared to sanction colonization, the acquisition of territory by a
recognized state and the imposition of its sovereignty over such territo-
ry.48 Such taking could occur as occupation,49subjugation, 5 or cession.5
In reality, the colonization of Africa utilized any of the three methods,
or a combination thereof, although according to international law at the
time only occupation was purportedly legal, since no recognized states
existed in Africa. Even within European idiom, occupation raises prob-
lems of its own because many of the entities colonized through it met
above all from Egypt of the Pharaohs. To those "founding fathers" in classical Greece,
any notion that Africans were inferior, morally or intellectually, would have seemed
merely silly.
DAVIDSON, HISTORY, supra note 39, at xxii-xxiii. For a careful, historical, and analytic
exploration of the African origins of classical civilizations, see MARTIN BERNAL, BLACK
ATHENA: THE AFROASIATIC ROOTS OF CLASSICAL CIVILIZATION (1987).
46. DAVIDSON, HISTORY, supra note 39, at xxii.
47. Id.
48. See generally POMEROY, supra note 17, at 95-114; OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at
436-70.
49. Occupation occurred when a recognized state acquired territory which was uninhabit-
ed, referred to as terra nullius, or inhabited by a people or an entity that international law did
not consider a state. Only a state could occupy territory. This is known as an "original" mode
of the acquisition of territory. Possession and effective administration of such territory, which
was considered no-man's land, made occupation real and were essential to it. See OPPENHEIM,
supra note 17, at 448-57.
50. Subjugation arose through the conquest of enemy territory in war and its subsequent
annexation by the conquering state. This conquest "disappeared" the vanquished state; but
title did not vest in the conqueror until annexation was effected. If the conquering state made
the conquered state give up only part of its territory in a "treaty of peace", then acquisition
was by cession, not subjugation. Id. at 461-67.
51. Cession was the acquisition of territory in a bilateral arrangement, where the parties,
who both had to be states, lost or gained territory by agreement or acquiescence through war.
Id. at 440-47.
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the criteria for statehood.52 Most African societies were organized in
ethno-political states, some highly centralized, others less so.53
52. While it is beyond the scope of this article to explore at length the history and
evolution of state formation in Africa, it is necessary for me to outline in a preliminary
manner the broad sketches of African political societies from a historical view in order to lay
to rest the mistaken and deliberately distorted view that African history started with its
colonization by Europeans. Apart from the Egyptian and Ethiopian civilizations, which the
West acknowledges but denies their black African origin, other parts of the continent have
long histories of developed state-societies. In West Africa, the Soninke kingdom has been
traced to 300 A.D., as were the Tekrur and Mandingo kingdoms in Senegal and Mali,
respectively. Between the ninth and sixteenth centuries, writers and travellers documented the
sophisticated states and kingdoms of ancient Ghana, Mali, Songhay, Benin, and others. Many
of these states engaged in inter-state relations, including commerce, sometimes with traders
from the Middle East. See DAVIDSON, CIVILIZATION, supra note 44, at 77-124. In East
Africa, by the nineteenth century, established states had arisen in southern Uganda, with the
Buganda, Bunyoro, and Ankole kingdoms as the most prominent. Others rose in northwestern
Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and among the Hehe and Nyamwezi in Tanzania. In central and
southern Africa, the Luba/Lunda and Kongo states in Angola-Zaire, the Mwanamutapa
kingdom in Zimbabwe, and the Swazi, Tswana, Zulu, and Sotho states can be traced from
anywhere around the fifteenth century; all predated the Scramble for Africa. For general
information on early African civilizations, see OLIVER, supra note 38, at 145-58; DAVIDSON,
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 141-83. See also BASIL DAVIDSON, THE LOST CITIES OF AFRICA
(1987) [hereinafter DAVIDSON, LOST CITIES]; CHEIKH ANTA DIOP, PRECOLONIAL BLACK
AFRICA (1987); T. OLAWALE ELIAS, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA 1-12 (2d ed.
1963). Oliver notes that though "[n]ot all of the Africans tried to found states," many "lived,
apparently from 'quite early in the Iron Age [around the ninth century], in states, and these
states were invariably in some sense hereditary monarchies." OLIVER, supra, at 145.
Politically, they were organized in clans or lineages under one ruler or a council of
elders and jealously guarded their independence and sovereignty but engaged in inter-state
relations with their neighbors. State-societies therefore had a permanent population, sovereign
authority and government, engaged in inter-state relations, and had a fixed territory. As noted
by Brownlie:
From the seventeenth century onwards societies became more organized. Agricul-
tural peoples certainly had a conception of territory and legitimate holding. Even
pastoral peoples have a conception of territory in the form of grazing grounds.
Records exist of a frontier dispute in the early nineteenth century between Sokoto
and Matsina in West Africa.
BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 8. He adds that the absence of adminis-
tration in "any very organized and centralized form, cannot rule out concepts of territory, of
legitimacy related to space, and consequently of frontiers." Id.
53. The requirements for an entity to meet the criteria for statehood were: sovereign
government, defined territory with a permanent population under its control, and a capacity to
engage in formal relations with other entities. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
These criteria were met by many African entities which fell to colonization. Pre-colonial
Africa consisted of two categories of societies. The first group consists of those states with
centralized authority, administrative machinery, and other standing state institutions such as
the Zulu, Ashanti, and Buganda. The second is those with less intrusive government organs,
such as the Akamba and the Kikuyu of Kenya, whose common cultural, ethnic, and linguistic
homogeneity gave them fundamental cohesion. For analyses of the organization of pre-
colonial state-societies, see generally ERIC 0. AYIsI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
AFRICAN POLITICAL CULTURE (1972); AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (M. Fortes & E.E.
Evans-Pritchard eds., 5th ed. 1940); JOSEPH MUTHIANI, AKAMBA FROM WITHIN (1973); JOMO
KENYATTA, FACING MOUNT KENYA (vintage ed. 1965); Kwasi Wiredu, An Akan Perspective
on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (Abdunabi
Ahmed An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990).
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Without much knowledge about the continent, early European jurists
and publicists had decided that much of Africa was a no-man's land that
could be brought under legal occupation. Territories inhabited by "per-
sons who are not recognized as belonging to the great family of states to
whom the international law applies," or "savage, barbarous tribes"
belonged as of right upon discovery to the "civilized and Christian
nation. ' ' 4 Oppenheim distinguished the protectorates of non-Christian
nations, such as Tunisia, Madagascar, Morocco, and Zanzibar, from the
"so-called protectorates over African tribes;" the latter were not states
and could be legally occupied in spite of "treaties" of protection with
local rulers." As weak states, the former had a higher status even
though they did not belong to the family of nations; sovereignty over
them could only be acquired through cession or conquest but not occu-
pation, although the end result was the same, the loss of sovereignty and
the brutal exploitation of human and natural resources.56
In addition to this arbitrary and convenient development of norms
and their selective application, the actualization of colonization itself
raised more legal and moral problems. The Berlin colonial conference,
for instance, only retroactively "ratified" and allocated existing "spheres
of influence, '7 in effect an attempt to seek legal shelter for an illegality
already committed. 58 Whereas the Protocols and the General Act of the
Conference of Berlin may have amicably settled imperialist rivalries,
and set out in detail the rules allocating and governing African territo-
ries, they did nothing to legalize colonialist occupation. The view of
colonized peoples, whose legality could not be validly questioned by the
imperialists, nullified the purported legality of colonialism. Rules of
"international law" exclusively crafted and employed by Europeans to
54. POMEROY, supra note 17, at 96. He argues that it "seems to be a law of Providence
that the peoples who are unfitted to develop the resources of the earth shall give way to those
that have the stronger race life, the most enduring persistence, the energy which transforms
the forest and the wilderness into the farm, the village, and the city." Id. at 96-97.
55. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 192-93.
56. Id. at 192-93, 436-70.
57.. According to Oppenheim, the concept of the "sphere of influence" grew out of "the
tendency of every colonising State to extend its occupation constantly and gradually into the
interior, or 'hinterland' of an occupied territory" in Africa. It described a "territory exclusive-
ly reserved for future occupation by a Power which ha[d] effectively occupied adjoining
territories" and helped prevent conflict with other powers interested in extending their
sovereignty over that or other territories in the area. Treaties between European powers were
concluded after the Berlin conference to firm up these claims; Great Britain, for example,
made such treaties with Portugal in 1890, with Italy in 1891, with Germany in 1886 and
1890, and with France in 1898. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 455.
58. DAvIDSON, HISTORY, supra note 38, at 284. Davidson notes that an "effective agree-
ment on partition had in fact long preceded" the conference. Id.
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extend their domination of other parts of the world could not have any
legality in Africa, particularly if the effect of their application meant the
loss of sovereignty. A Lagos paper captured the African interpretation of
the legality of the Act of Berlin in sharp condemnatory language: "[t]he
world has, perhaps, never witnessed a robbery on so large a scale.
Africa is helpless to prevent it... It is on the cards that this 'Christian'
business can only end, at no distant date, in the annihilation of the
natives. 5 9
Wars of conquest and fraudulent treaties with African rulers and
societies were the agencies for the effective imposition of European
sovereignty. Occupation met with "tough resistance" almost everywhere
as wars of "invasion or pacification" were "dark with slaughter and
destruction. '  German brutality and the killings of thousands of Afri-
cans in its efforts to establish control over the Herero of present-day
Namibia and the Hehe of Tanzania were not isolated incidents. 6' Even
when conquests of such severity were not undertaken, effective colonial
rule was imposed by "treaties of protection" between African rulers and
European powers, usually after a war, through coercion, intimidation,
deceit, or any combination thereof.62 King Dosunmu of Lagos, for
59. U.O. Umozurike, International Law and Colonialism in Africa, 3 E. AFR. L. REV. 47,
50 (1970) (quoting LAGOS OBSERVER, Feb. 19, 1885) (ellipsis in original). Even a colonizer
later confessed to the illegality of colonialism. Sir Alan Burns, the former Governor of Nige-
ria, stated: "[n]o European nation had the right to assume sovereignty over the inhabitants of
any part of Africa, and the claims put forward by the various Governments at the Berlin
Conference in 1885 took little account of the rights of the people who lived in the territories
claimed." See HISTORY OF NIGERIA 277 (4th ed. 1948), quoted in ELIAS, supra note 15, at 18.
60. DAVIDSON, HISTORY, supra note 39, at 284-85. King Leopold of Belgium and his
agents of the "strangely named Congo Free State" caused untold death and destruction. This
story was repeated often. Id.
Like the British in the lands behind Lagos and the Gold Coast, the French encoun-
tered strong peoples who were proud of their independence, and were ready to
fight for it. Their resistance failed in the end because they possessed inferior
equipment and military organization.... Yet it needed nearly twenty years of
warfare for the French to make good their claim to the lands of ancient Ghana,
Mali and Songhay.
Id.
61. Local resistance to German colonialism was effective among the Hehe and related
peoples first beginning in the late nineteenth century and later in 1905 with the Maji Maji
uprising. As a result, the "whole region was laid waste by colonial soldiery, who burned
villages, destroyed standing crops and confiscated livestock." OLIVER, supra note 38, at 198.
In addition to the massacres, the ensuing famine claimed an estimated 200,000 lives. In
Namibia, then South West Africa, three quarters of the Herero population was exterminated
by German repression between 1905-07. See id. Of an estimated 80,000 Hereros, only about
15,000 survived the genocide. RUTH FIRST, SOUTH WEST AFRICA 28 (1963), quoted in
Umozurike, supra note 59, at 50.
62. See generally Umozurike, supra note 58.
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instance, was attacked by the British when he refused to surrender
sovereignty over his whole territory. After the war, he signed a treaty,
stating:
I Docemo, do, with the consent and advice of my Council, give,
transfer, and by these presents grant and confirm unto the Queen of
Great Britain, her heirs and successors for ever, the Port and the
Island of Lagos, with all the rights, profits, territories and appurte-
nances whatsoever thereunto belonging, and as well the profits and
revenue and the direct, full and absolute dominion and sovereignty
of the said port, island, and premises, with all the royalties thereof,
freely, fully, entirely, and absolutely.
63
The absolutist language of the "treaty," its one-sided capitulation by
Dosunmu, and the complete, unconscionable "renunciation" over the
sovereignty of his people, territory, and resources is of such absurdity
that, if taken seriously, it would make a mockery of the notion of a
treaty and the concept of freedom of contract. The attitude of Europe-
ans, such as Lord Lugard, the notorious colonialist, was revealing of the
lack of seriousness with which they took the "treaties" with Africans.
He described the conclusion of one "treaty" with a "savage chief' whom
he promised British "protection," purportedly without loss of sovereign-
ty, in such pejorative and mocking language that it seemed clear that he
could not have thought of the agreement in contractual terms, but rather
as a necessary nuisance to secure a sphere of influence.6, Treaties were
written by Europeans in their own technical language,65 granting them
63. See U.O. UMOZURIKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 40 (1979)
[hereinafter UMOZURIKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW]. Another account of "treaty-making" read:
Sir Frederick Lugard of Northern Nigeria preceded negotiations with short military
actions in order to place himself in a position of strength. Consul Ralph Moor of
the Niger Coast Protective moved up and down the Cross River with troops
shelling and destroying villages before settling down to make 'treaties of friend-
ship' with the frightened people.
Ukpabi, Military Considerations in African Foreign Policies, 6 TRANSITION 31, 33-40 (1967),
quoted in CHRISTOPHER QUAYE, LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 325
(1991).
64. F. Lugard, Treaty-making Africa, 2 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 53 (1893), quoted in
Umozurike, supra note 59, at 52. Lugard wrote of the treaty-making ceremony in the most
demeaning language: "seated cross-legged on a mat opposite to each other on the ground, you
should picture a savage chief in his best turn-out which consists probably of his weapons of
war, different chalk colourings on his face, a piece of skin of a leopard, wild cat, sheep,
ox .... After an exchange of "promises" in which the African ruler "welcomed" the British,
and Lugard undertook not to "eat up his [the African ruler's] land" or oust him, Lugard then
"put down on paper what was the pith of the contract between us; that is treaty as I consider
it." Id.
65. The treaties were written in the idiom of jurisprudence prevalent in Europe at the
time, one of the many indications of their one-sided nature.
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sovereignty over the territory.6 The exchange was a mockery: Lugard
spoke of a "valuable concession purchased by the present of an old pair
of boots." 67 Many Africans who signed the treaties of "protection"
mistakenly thought the stranger would respect their sovereignty if they
showed him hospitality. King Jaja of Opobo, a Nigerian Ibo, found to
his dismay that the meaning of "protection" could be elusive. He was
denied trading rights even after assurances that "protection" would leave
his country still under his government."
It is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain the legality of the "treaties
of protection" even under extant European law at the time. Treaty law
was clear about who could enter into a treaty and what conditions gave
it binding authority. Only states had treaty-making power by virtue oftheir sovereignty.' A treaty had to have the mutual consent of the
contracting parties and that consent had to be real and given under
absolute freedom for the treaty's validity,70 provided that defeat in war
and the subsequent cession of territory under duress did not invalidate a
treaty.71 Even if consent was real among the parties, a treaty was not
binding if the "consent was given in error, or under a delusion produced
by a fraud. 72 Invalidity extended to treaties obtained by intimidation.73
Many of the treaties of protection were obtained by intimidation, fraud,
mistake or error because the parties misunderstood each other, or with-
out real or mutual consent. 74 In addition, the treaties were invalid be-
cause European law did not recognize African political entities as states,
with treaty-making power, and the rulers of those entities as heads of
66. Umozurike, supra note 59, at 52. One of the most effective methods of colonization,
despite the long-enduring resistance by Africans, was the "process of infiltration, steadily
advanced until the stage of 'effective occupation' could be reached, behind the screen of
'treaties of protection'. These were 'signed' with one or another European power by chiefs
who could seldom or never have understood the intention of their new 'protectors'."
DAVIDSON, HISTORY, supra note 39, at 286.
67. Umozurike, supra note 59, at 53.
68. Id. at 53. It was devious and ironic that to obtain the treaty of protection one
European power would threaten Africans with colonization by another European power even
though the spheres of influence had been settled at the Berlin conference.
69. Such power was exercised by heads of state or their personally appointed representa-
tives. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 705-06.
70. Id. at 710-11.
71. Pomeroy argued that although consent had to be freely given and mutual, the one
exception where a treaty was nevertheless valid arose when a state "surrenders some right,
perhaps cedes territory." POMEROY, supra note 17, at 340.
72. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 712.
73. Id. at 711.
74. See Umozurike, supra note 59, at 52.
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state; they were mere "chiefs" of "tribes. 75 Such treaties would certainly
be illegal if judged by the principles of current treaty law which is
based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.76 One African
scholar has argued that these principles, which existed then, invalidated
the "treaties. 77
C. The Contrived State: The Drawing of a New Map
The process of drawing new frontiers and the effective occupation
of the territories started in earnest as soon as spheres of influence were
delimited among European powers. While the last two decades of the
nineteenth century were used to conquer and establish presence, the first
two of the twentieth century were decades of "pacification" and the
imposition of colonial rule through the colonial state. The new states
Were usually created by amalgamating, by force or "treaty of protec-
tion," numerous pre-existing African traditional states or ethno-political
communities. The new territories were an actualization of the "spheres
of influence." The loss of sovereignty by pre-colonial states was there-
fore followed by their combination into single, unitary states.78 Thou-
sands of independent pre-colonial states were compressed into some
forty new states.79
The typical example of Kenya and Uganda will suffice to demon-
strate the callous and arbitrary process of boundary delimitation. The
area today known as Kenya was declared a British sphere of influence
in 1886 and declared the East African Protectorate in 1896; it was
annexed and became the Kenya Colony in 1920.80 Although ' the area
now called Uganda also became a British sphere of influence in 1886
and was named the Uganda Protectorate in 1894, even then its bound-
75. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 193.
76. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.39/27, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). Among other things, the
Convention calls for treaties to respect the following principles: free consent, good faith,
pacta sunt servanda, self-determination and equal rights, prohibition of the threat of the use
of force, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states.
77. Umozurike argues that the Vienna Convention did not "create but merely re-affirmed
these principles for they were in existence when the treaties were concluded with African
Kings." Umozurike, supra note 59, at 52.
78. Only ten pre-colonial states retained a semblance of their pre-colonial territorial
integrity. See supra note 6.
79. For a comprehensive and detailed account of the creation of the boundaries of the
current African states, including the agreements between imperial powers and other evidence
of bargaining among them, see generally BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, supra note 20.
This complete account provides the agreements and other evidence of boundary creation for
all African countries.
80. Id. at 775.
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aries remained uncertain because the British could not immediately
determine the status of the kingdoms of Buganda, Toro, and Ankole. 81
Later, these pre-colonial states lost their sovereignty as they became part
of the new Ugandan state. Between 1900-1902, the British even con-
templated combining Kenya and Uganda into one protectorate.8 2 In
1902, a large tract of eastern Uganda, consisting of its "Eastern Prov-
ince, the southern part of the Elgon district of central Uganda and the
southern portion of Rudolf Province" was transferred and became the
Kisumu and Naivasha provinces of Kenya.83
Little consideration was given to pre-colonial inter-state relations or
other relationships between different traditional states. In the majority of
cases, the map-makers proceeded as though Africa was a blank slate,
uninhabited. 4 The observations of imperial statesmen were very telling
about how they perceived their cartography. As noted by Anene, "[t]he
manner in which the boundaries were made was often a subject for
after-dinner jokes among European statesmen. ' 85 In 1890, for example,
Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, remarked at a dinner at
Mansion House following the conclusion of the Anglo-French Conven-
tion which established spheres of influence in West Africa, that "[w]e
have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's
foot ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and
lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we
never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were."86
81. KENNETH INGHAM, THE MAKING OF MODERN UGANDA 41-85 (1958).
82. BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 941.
83. Id. at 942. These transfers survived independence but became the subject of tension
in 1976 when Idi Amin, then Ugandan president, laid claim on them. Id.
84. At the Berlin Conference, Africa was "regarded as terra nullius, subject to the
possession of the European power exercising effective authority. They never took into account
that there were people of vastly different backgrounds and cultures living on the continent."
Chris M. Peter, The Proposed African Court of Justice - Jurisprudential, Procedural,
Enforcement Problems and Beyond, 1 E. AIR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTs. 117, 124-25 (1993)
(footnotes omitted). The International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara case said that
the colonization of Africa was not "occupation" in the technical sense; the "treaties" with
African rulers indicated that the continent was not considered terra nullius proper. Western
Sahara (Advisory Opinion), 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16), at 39.
85. ANENE, supra note 7, at 3.
86. Id. Anene quotes another senior British official who was involved in creating the
boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon, saying that:
In those days we just took a blue pencil and a rule, and we put it down at Old
Calabar, and drew that line to Yola ... I recollect thinking when I was sitting
having an audience with the Emir [of Yola], surrounded by his tribe, that it was a
very good thing that he did not know that I, with a blue pencil, had drawn a line
through his territory.
Id. at 2-3 (quoting The Geographical Journal, vol. xxviii, Proceedings, March 9, 1914).
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Divisions were driven by pressures of competition between Europe-
an powers, their trading companies, and in many instances the influence
of Christian denominations.87 Sometimes, states or entities with a history
of tension and war between them were lumped into the same state." In
other cases, the new frontiers split ethnic and linguistic groups from
their political societies and located them in different states.8 9 Famous
examples are those of the Masai, who were divided between Kenya and
Tanzania," and the Ewe in Togo and Ghana.9' An irony of the arbitrary
borders was the "unity" of African pre-colonial states imposed under the
roof of the colonial state but also the "disunity" created by the colonial
policy of divide and rule.' According to Brownlie:
Boundary making in the period of European expansion in Africa
took place in circumstances which generally militated against
reference to tribal or ethnological considerations. Political bargain-
ing involved the construction of parcels of territory upon broad
principles evidenced graphically by liberal resort to straight lines
and general features such as drainage basins and watersheds. With-
in a framework of overall political bargaining, the accidents of
prior exploration and military penetration were often to determine
delimitation as between Britain, France and Germany. Thus the
map of West Africa was drawn. In any case lines were commonly
drawn on maps at a stage when there was no very great knowledge
of the region concerned. The boundaries which emerged were
87. The Buganda kingdom, for example, faced competition from both the British and
German commercial companies which attempted to secure a "treaty of protection" for
different countries.
The Anglican missionaries at the capital advised their followers to sign the British
treaty, while the French White Fathers favored the German one. In the event, the
issue was settled in Europe by the Anglo-German agreement of 1890, but not
before the representative of the British company, Frederick Lugard, had used his
Swahili soldiers and single Maxim gun to support the Protestant party against the
Catholic one.
OLIVER, supra note 38, at 179-80.
88. The Akamba, Kikuyu, and the Masai, three groups which fought each other from
time to time, were all bunched into the new state of Kenya. See CHARLES W. HOBLEY,
ETHNOLOGY OF THE A-KAMBA AND OTHER EAST AFRICA TRIBES 43-48 (1910). Examples
abound elsewhere in Africa.
89. See Kenneth M. Barbour, A Geographical Analysis of Boundaries in Inter-Tropical
Africa, in EsSAYS ON AFRICAN POPULATION 303 (Kenneth M. Barbour & R.M. Protero eds.,
1961).
90. BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 938.
91. Id. at 277.
92. See MAZRUI, supra note 6, at 108. Divide and rule was the strategy of favoring one
group over another to heighten ethnic animosities with the intention of making the task of
colonial administration more difficult to challenge. Id.
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generally based upon geographical features, especially rivers and
watersheds, and astronomical or geometrical lines.93
The newly contrived state represented, for many Africans, the
physical symbol of the loss of independence and sovereignty over their
societies. The manner in which it was created, after long periods of
resistance, the way in which it was governed, and the purpose for which
it brought into existence, namely the exploitation of both natural and
human resources, were a grim reminder of the luxuries of self-gover-
nance. Colonial policies were harsh and brutally implemented. 94 Such
practices did little to endear Africans to the state or develop a loyalty
towards it.
D. The Validation of the Colonial State in International Law
The first major attempt to validate95 and essentialize 6 the colonial
state occurred at the start of the League of Nations.97 The League Cove-
nant provided for the Mandate System to deal with the colonies of those
defeated in the war: Germany and Turkey.98 The Mandate System
purported to commit the international community to the development
93. BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 6. Brownlie also notes that in
some cases, the map-makers included ethnology and traditional political societies as one of
the factors. In creating Nigeria, for example, the traditional boundaries were followed in the
north and west to make administration easier. The same was true of Burundi, Rwanda, most
of North Africa, parts of Kenya, and so on. Id. at 6-7. While keeping pre-colonial administra-
tive units together may have made for easier colonization, it did not solve the problem of loss
of sovereignty and the coercion of different pre-colonial states under one, unitary colonial
state.
94. In the Congo, for example, Africans were forced by the Belgians to collect rubber in
the wild. Those who failed or resisted the task were visited with punitive expeditions in which
thousands were brutally murdered. See Umozurike, supra note 59, at 51.
95. By "validate" I do not mean legalize; rather, I refer to the recognition, at the first
major international meeting after the Berlin Conference, of the fact of colonial states as
entities with rights and responsibilities under the metropolitan powers. The processes of
colonization, the creation of new states, and the implication of the permanence of the new
entities, even where they were carved up haphazardly, were given de facto recognition.
96. I use this term only to denote the view adopted by imperial and major powers within
the League of Nations [hereinafter League] to present colonization as an essential duty of the
West to "civilize" and bring to "political maturity" colonial peoples.
97. The Covenant of the League of Nations addressed matters relating to colonies and
other territories under certain League members. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT arts. 22, 23.
98. Id. art. 22. The Mandate System was established by the Allied and Associated
Powers under article 22 to address the fate of 15 mandated territories in all. In 1919 at the
Paris Peace Conference, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States denied that its
"purpose was merely to divide up the spoils" but to serve peoples from underdeveloped areas
and to prevent an occurrence of the abuses committed by Germans in their colonies. See RAY
S. BAKER, WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT 262 (1923).
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and the welfare of colonial peoples." It grouped the colonies into three
categories, depending on their levels of development.' The likelihood
of independence appeared to be a central criteria for categorization.''
The League outlawed the annexation of territory and required the man-
datory powers to work to improve the lives of the colonies as wards of
civilization.'02 Among other things, the Mandate System was hypocriti-
cal in its exclusion of the colonies of the victors from scrutiny.'0 3 It was
little more than a charade to justify the dispossession of Germany and
Turkey of their territories.
The League of Nations Covenant did not outlaw colonialism or any
of its creations. It in fact provided a firm basis for the acceptance of the
new global map. It strengthened the extant law on colonial dependen-
cies: although they possessed some of the qualities of international
persons, and had such capacity, the "parent" or imperial powers re-
99. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 6. The paternalistic and racist views
of the West were stunning. It provided, in part, that
[tio those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war [1914-
1918] have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly gov-
erned them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves
under the strenuous conditions of the modem world, there should be applied the
principle that well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of
civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied
in the Covenant.
Id.
100. Id. art. 22, para. 3. "The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage
of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic
conditions and other similar circumstances." Id.
101. In Type A Mandates Iraq and Palestine went to Britain and Syria and Lebanon to
France; in Type B, British Cameroons, British Togoland, and Tanganyika were given to
Britain while French Cameroons and French Togoland went to France, and Ruanda Urundi to
Belgium; in Type C Mandates, South West Africa was given to the Union of South Africa,
Samoa to New Zealand, Nauru to the British Empire, other Pacific Islands south of the
Equator to Australia, and Pacific Islands north of the Equator to Japan. OPPENHEIM, supra
note 16, at 207-09. For Type A Mandates, the obligation of the administering powers was to
provide aid and advice on government matters until they could become fully independent.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 4. For Type B, the powers were required to
administer them under "conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion,
subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, [and] the prohibition of abuses
such as the slave trade." Id. art. 22, para. 5. Type C Mandates were to be governed in
accordance with the laws of the mandatory powers. Id. art. 22, para. 6. Most of the Type A
Mandates gained their independence before the end of the League of Nations.
102. The mandatory powers were required to submit annual reports to the League
Council "in reference to the territory committed to its charge." LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVE-
NANT art. 22, para. 7.
103. Although in reality it mattered little whether a colony was mandated or not - as
exploitation and brutalities were common in either case - the victors by not "regulating" the
governance of their colonies allowed themselves license to behave as they wished. See
Umozurike, supra note 59, at 56.
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mained ultimately responsible for their affairs.'14 The post-1945 period,
and especially the norms, rules, and positions adopted by the United
Nations and its agencies, 05 seem to confirm this assertion. The differ-
ence, of course, is that the U.N. expressly called for decolonization and
spent considerable energy advancing the achievement of that goal. It
established mechanisms for international accountability over the colo-
nies.1°6 In particular, the U.N. Trusteeship System departed from the
League tradition and brought all colonies and other dependent territories
under the tutelage of the West.'O° Although the Charter of the United
Nations did not explicitly mention colonialism, it contradicts it by
supporting self-determination' ° and affirming fundamental human
rights.'0 9
Two leading views on the legality of colonialism under the U.N.
Charter have been articulated."0 The first view argues that the Charter
of the United Nations "expressly recognizes the legitimacy of colonial-
ism in Chapter XI."' Similarly, others argue less credibly that the duty
to account to the United Nations on the administration of colonies is a
recognition of the legitimacy of colonialism."2 The second view, popu-
104. Colonies were not regarded as states although some of them, such as India, were
allowed to conclude treaties, a function ordinarily reserved for independent and sovereign
states. See HENKIN, supra note 3, at 274.
105. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, Dec. 14, 1960, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960);
G.A. Res. 1654 (XVI), Nov. 27, 1961, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 17, 65, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961) (establishing a 17-member body to oversee the implementation of resolution 1514).
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 86 (establishing the Trusteeship Council, the body responsible
for overseeing the administration of colonies and other dependent territories).
107. Id. arts. 75-91 (imposing duties on all administering powers, not just over the
territories of the vanquished but on all powers to promote self-government and independence).
The Trusteeship Council was empowered to monitor and regulate the administration of
colonies.
108. Id. art. 1,1 2 and art. 55 (implicitly recognizing the right to self-determination). The
traditional and classic exercise of the legal right to self-determination involves the internation-
al recognition of the right of the inhabitants or peoples of a colony or dependency to freely
choose their independence or association with another state.
109. Id. art. 55.
110. For a brief review of the two opposing views, see QUAYE, supra note 63, at
108-09. Quaye supports the former.
11. Thomas Moodie Kuhn, Terrorism in International Law 82 (Jan. 1980) (unpublished
L.L.D. dissertation, University of South Africa). He argues that, as a basis for his position, the
Charter does not permit the use of force to end colonialism. Id.
112. C.J.R. Dugard, The Organization of African Unity and Colonialism: An Inquiry into
the Plea of Self-Defence as a Justification for the Use of Force in the Eradication of Colo-
nialism, 16 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 157, 172 n.86 (1967). He writes that "[t]he Charter of the
United Nations, as framed in 1945, implicitly recognised the legitimacy of colonialism"
because it imposed on administering powers the duty of accountability to the United Nations
for the administration of the colonies. Id. at 172-73.
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lar in the former colonies, is that the Charter illegalizes colonialism." 3 It
is perhaps more plausible to argue that the U.N. Charter is evasive on
the legality of colonialism. Although it provided for the administration
and the preparation of the colonies for self-government and indepen-
dence, regulation does not amount to legalization."1
4
Significantly, the Charter did not challenge the validity of the colo-
nial state as an entity; there is no suggestion anywhere that the colonial
state is a nullity or that sovereignty should be returned to pre-colonial
states and peoples in the process of preparing them for independence.
The Charter in fact does the exact opposite: it recognizes the right to
political self-determination only for those territorial units that are "inter-
nationally determined," of which the colonies are the classic example." 5
The United Nations and international law have defined the "self' who
possesses the right of self-determination as the peoples bounded by a
territorial unit within a colonial state. Thus the criteria for "peoplehood"
include "commonality of interests, group identity, distinctiveness, and a
territorial link."" 6 This definition would seem to encompass pre-colonial
groups and state-societies such as the Akamba of Kenya or the Sukuma
of Tanzania as well as collections of such groups under the rubric of the
colonial state as Mozambiquans or Ugandans. It is only the latter, not
the former, who can exercise the right to self-determination.
113. During a debate in the Security Council on the Portuguese colonies, a Brazilian
delegate stated that "[n]o one doubts that the Charter in its Chap. XI put an end to the so-
called legitimacy of colonialism." Id. at 172 n.86 (quoting U.N. SCOR, 18th Sess., 1043d
mtg. at para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV 1043).
India made the same argument in 1961 to justify its invasion of the Portuguese state of
Goa which it sought to bring under its sovereignty. The Indian delegate to the Security
Council argued it was of no consequence that Portugal had occupied Goa for 450 years. He
went on to state that Portugal "ha[d] no sovereign right over this territory. There is no legal
frontier - there can be no legal frontier - between India and Goa. And since the whole
occupation is illegal as an issue - it started in an illegal manner, it continues to be illegal
today and it is even more illegal in the light of resolution 1514." U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess.,
987th mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV 987 (1961).
114. U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-91 (providing for manner of administration of colonies and
for independence).
115. See U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
116. See Richard N. Kiwanuka, The Meaning of 'People' in the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 80, 87-88 (1988). In a report to the United
Nations, Aureliu Cristescu defined "people" for the purposes of self-determination as a social
entity with a clear identity and its own set of characteristics. It must be connected to a
territory, and is not to be confused with ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. AURELIU
CRISTESCU, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENT
ON THE BASIS OF UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS, 1 279, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev. 1,
U.N. Sales No. E.80.XIV.3 (1981), quoted in Kiwanuka, supra, at 87.
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Until the secession of Eritrea,"7 the general practice of the Organi-
zation of African Unity (OAU), like the United Nations, was to equate
political self-determination with independence from colonial or minority
regime situations. It was not extended to sectors of the population within
an independent or in non-racist regime cases, previously the condition in
Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe." 8 Such groups or sectors, even
though they belonged to different pre-colonial states and ethnicities,
were seen and treated as having the same destiny, and becoming inde-
pendent within the same state, regardless of their will. For instance, self-
determination for Kenyan peoples was not viewed as a right that differ-
ent ethnic groups could exercise separately, an event that could have
occasioned the dismemberment of the country. Kiwanuka argues that
international law would have denied the Amazulu, Amaxhosa, Basotho,
and other South African groups the right to pursue their own genuine,
sovereign independence from the Apartheid regime.'' 9 The reasoning
was:
That people would be seceding from a future state. International
law already treats the right to self-determination as tied to the
specific geographically defined territory. Further subdivisions
would not be consistent, with that position. Moreover, a people
wishing to go its separate way, as, say, in South Africa, would
have to renounce the authority of the liberation movement repre-
senting it. In our example, this would be the African National
Congress or the Pan Africanist Congress, both of which are recog-
nized by the OAU. That organization would be most unlikely to
support any such secessionist aspirations. 20
117. Following a long and bloody secessionist struggle against Ethiopia, Eritrea became
an independent state in 1993 after its military defeat of Ethiopia in 1991. It was the first
country to break away from an independent African state. Edmond Keller, Remaking the
Ethiopian State, in COLLAPSED STATES 130-34 (I. William Zartman ed., 1995).
118. See generally David A. Ijalaye, Was 'Biafra At Any lime a State in International
Law?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 551 (1971). One view, which seems predominant, is that with the
end of majority rule in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, only Western Sahara is a
proper subject of self-determination. See Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public
Order: Community Response to territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779 (1976).
Eritreans persisted and eventually became a separate state with the military defeat of Ethiopia.
See supra note 117. In addition, the problem of the southern Sudan could trigger separate
statehood the denial of the right by international law notwithstanding.
119. Kiwanuka, supra note 116, at 90. Kiwanuka does not mean the pseudo-indepen-
dence the Apartheid regime purported to give under the Bantustan policy; rather, he asks
whether it would have been allowed for the different nationalities to pursue sovereign
independence from South Africa and become sovereign states. Id. at 89-90. For a discussion
of the Bantustan policy, see Henry J. Richardson, III, Self-Determination, International Law
and the South African Bantustan Policy, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185 (1978).
120. Kiwanuka, supra note 116, at 90.
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International law only seemed to contemplate the right of the territo-
rial unit as a whole to choose to become free as one entity or to associ-
ate with another state; the birth of many new states from one territorial
unit, based on pre-colonial political identities, seems to be out of the
question.' In other words, self-determination is linked to the adminis-
trative units established by the imperial powers. Such linkage validates
the colonial state, retroactively ratifies colonial borders, and sanctions
the denial of sovereignty to pre-colonial state-societies. 22 This contrived
state is beset by a multitude of problems, many of them a result of the
nature of its conception and creation.
II. FALSE STATEHOOD AND THE CRISIS
OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE
In 1884-1885, the European imperial powers met in Berlin and
without the consent or the participation of the African people,
demarcated the Continent of Africa into colonies or spheres of
influence. In many cases, kingdoms or tribes were split with such
reckless abandon that they came under two or three European
imperial powers. This event was the genesis of many present-day
conflicts and virtually insoluble problems in the African Conti-
nent.'23
The proposition that colonization is largely responsible for Africa's
economic, political, and social problems is not new. 24 The performance
of the post-colonial state since independence has been abysmal, if not
catastrophic. 125 Military coups and one-party dictatorships characterized
121. This thinking appears to be partly the basis for the decision by the U.N. to extend
to liberation movements recognized by the OAU, engaged in the pursuit of self-determination
and international recognition. Such movements - examples were the African National
Congress (ANC) of South Africa and the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO)
- could sit in the General Assembly as observers and participate in other U.N. agencies.
G.A. Res. 3280, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A.
Res. 31/30, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 118, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
122. This is similar to the principle of uti possidetis juris, adopted in Latin America, that
the successor states of the Spanish empire would stay within the parcels of territory that
represented the administrative units of the empire. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 137-38 (1973); 2 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 1068 (1963).
123. ELIAS, supra note 15, at viii.
124. For analyses linking the crises of the post-colonial state to colonization, see Ali
Mazrui, The African State as a Political Refugee: Institutional Collapse and Human Displace-
ment, INT'L J. REFUGEE L., Special Issue July 1995, at 21. [hereinafter Mazrui, State as
Refugee]; KWAME NKRUMAH, NEO-COLONIALISM: THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM (1965).
125. The performance of the post-colonial state has been so poor that the period of
independence has been referred to as the "lost decades." See generally 30 YEARS OF INDEPEN-
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most of the first two decades of independence from colonial rule.'26 The
result of this failure is the delegitimation, assuming that the overthrow
of direct colonial occupation or decolonization gave it a measure of
goodwill, of the post-colonial state before its legitimation. According to
Bratton, in the process of state formation the apparatus of governance of
the post-colonial state "has begun to crumble before it has been fully
consolidated."' 27 The failure of the post-colonial state,128 from Liberia to
Mozambique, and Rwanda to Somalia, 129 has driven Mazrui to meta-
DENCE, supra note 4. Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from 3.3% in the 1960s to -
2.2% in the 1980s. Other statistics are equally alarming. Two thirds of the rural population lives
below the poverty line and civil wars, famine, and natural disasters have claimed millions and
displaced many more. The continent has reached the state of "development breakdown." See
generally N. Bourenane, ProspectsforAfricafor an Alternative Approach to the Dominant Afro-
pessimism, in 30 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 4, at 47-61. For more on economic
problems, see AFRICA's RECOVERY IN THE 1990s (Giovanni Comia et al. eds., 1992).
126. The Togolese army staged the first military coup in Black Africa in the early 1960s.
This phenomenon, one of the many driven partly by the search of the post-colonial state for
a political culture, national identity, and community among the citizenry, became so wide-
spread that by the 1980s half of the continent was ruled either by a military dictatorship or a
military-civilian composition. Rare was the state spared rule by soldiers. As noted by Mowoe,
the soldiers in a standard pattern would "inveigh against the total corruption of the charlatans
who, in their greed and avarice, had brought the state to near-bankruptcy and imminent
collapse. Their actions are thus explained as having been made necessary because of a
palpable desire to save the nation and lead its citizens to the millennium." Isaac J. Mowoe,
Soldiers and Politics, in THE PERFORMANCE OF SOLDIERS As GOVERNORS 1, 11 (Isaac J.
Mowoe ed., 1980). In reality, ideological differences within ruling elites, failure of economic
policies, super-power manipulation, and corruption by civilians - in a word, the fragility of
the state - contributed to the rise of the soldier as governor. See id. at 11-14. Ironically, the
performance of the military was quite often worse. Idi Amin's overthrow of the government
of Milton Obote in 1971, for example, ushered in almost a decade of such gross and un-
equalled brutality that it became a synonym for human rights violations. See generally TONY
AVIRGAN & MARTHA HONEY, WAR IN UGANDA (1982). Elsewhere, military rulers in Sudan,
Liberia, and Zaire crippled the state as a result of excessive despotism. See MICHAEL
CLOUGH, FREE AT LAST: U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR
76-100 (1992).
127. Michael Bratton, Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa,
41 WORLD POL. 407, 409 (1989). He adds that
[t]here is a crisis of political authority that is just as severe as the well-known crisis
of economic production. These two crises are intimately interrelated, each being
both a cause and an effect on the other. We are currently witnessing in Africa a
self-perpetuating cycle of change, in which weak states engender anemic economies
whose poor performance in turn further undermines the capacity of the state
apparatus.
Id. For more analyses of the problems of the post-colonial state, see Thomas M. Callaghy,
The State as Lame Leviathan: the Patrimonial Administrative State in Africa, in THE AFRICAN
STATE IN TRANSITION 87, 87-116 (Zaki Ergas ed., 1987); Robert H. Jackson & Carl G.
Rosberg, Why Africa's Weak States Persist, 35 WORLD POL. 1 (1982).
128. For a more recent discussion on collapsed states, see generally COLLAPSED STATES,
supra note 117.
129. For a more detailed discussion of the circumstances that led to the implosion of the
Somali state, see THE SOMALI CHALLENGE: FROM CATASTROPHE TO RENEWAL (Ahmed 1.
Samatar ed., 1994).
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phorically refer to it as a "political refugee." 3° Such a state cannot per-
form the six crucial functions of statehood: exercise sovereign control
over territory; have sovereign oversight and supervision of the nations's
resources; exercise the effective and rational collection of revenue;
maintain adequate national infrastructure, such as roads and telephone
systems; have the capacity to govern and to maintain law and order.'
3'
The contrived and artificial citizenry of the African state is at the
center of this crisis. Although the struggle against colonial rule within
the boundary of the colonial state created unity among different commu-
nities, it was insufficient to form a national identity. 32 The development
of authoritarianism in the emergent state, typified by ethnic-based favor-
itism for jobs, services, and other state-controlled resources, was inevita-
bly a natural process; the new rulers saw their power as an instrument
for personal gain with the assistance and participation of elites from
their own group. 133 The process of nation-building has been hindered by
the inability of the post-colonial state to wrest the loyalties of citizens
from pre-colonial structures and formations, most notably the ethno-
political society.
134
Some writers have questioned whether African states are nation-
states.'35 Ethnicity and sub-nationalism have been correctly identified as
130. Mazrui, State as Refugee, supra note 124, at 21. He notes that the African state
could even become a literal refugee if the remnants of the Hutu-state in Rwanda were to be
granted institutional asylum as a government-in-exile next door [Zaire]. Id. at 22.
131. Id. at 23. He argues that it is wrong to limit the assessment of state failure to the
sixth function, namely the maintenance of law and order. The other indices are warning signs
of impending failure. Id.
132. Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in
Africa, 13 AFR. DEV. 72 (1988).
133. The process of the collapse of national coalitions that brought about decolonization
"involved the incorporation of 'kith and kin' into ruling oligarchies and the exclusion of other
groups from enjoying the prerogatives of power. This generated problems of ethnicity,
clanism, regionalism, religious bigotry, etc." Jibrin Ibrahim, Political Exclusion, Democratiza-
tion and Dynamics of Ethnicity in Niger, 41 AFR. TODAY 15, 15 (1994).
134. Busia convincingly argues that in pre-colonial Africa "primary loyalties were
centered on lineage and tribe." These communities were held together because they "inhabited
a common territory; its members shared a tradition, real or fictitious, of common descent; and
they were held together by a common language and a common culture." This "tribal solidarity
of the past invades the present. It sets problems of political organization for the new States of
Africa. It has been a source of tensions and instability. It has led to civil war in the Congo.
Nigeria tried to contain its tribal tensions in a federation .. " K.A. BusIA, AFRICA IN
SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY 30-31 (1967).
135. Hansen argues that African states are states hoping to become nation-states. Ethnic
cleavages are the biggest drawback to the development of a nation. Art Hansen, African
Refugees: Defining and Defending Their Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVER-
NANCE IN AFRICA 139-67 (Ronald Cohen et al. eds., 1993).
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some of the most inflammatory elements in nation-building. 36 Hansen
has identified the crisis of the African state in its failure to transform the
colonial state. 37 He argues that though formally independent, African
states are still conceptually colonial entities, heavily reliant on the
structures of the colonial state. 138 There is little doubt that the only
significant change at independence was not the restructuring of the state
but the changing of the guard, the replacement of white by black faces
in the state house. 139 It fell on the new rulers to bring legitimacy to the
colonial state, now labeled the post-colonial, black-ruled state. As Han-
sen points out, that challenge was enormous:
The term "nation" refers to a group that shares a common history
and identity and is aware of that; they are a people, not just a
population. Using that definition, ethnic groups (once called tribes)
in Africa are also nations. None of the new African states were
originally nation-states because none of them were nations as well
as states. Each of the new states contains more than one nation. In
their border areas, many new states contain parts of nations be-
cause the European-inspired borders cut across existing national
territories. Thus one of the major tasks confronting the leaders of
136. Mowoe, supra note 126, at 1; P. Anyang' Nyong'o, The One-Party State and Its
Apologists, in 30 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 4, at 1. Anyang' Nyong'o discusses
and attempts to demystify the argument that the one-party state was the only logical response
to problems of ethnicity, development, and the construction of new nations from the colonial
state.
137. Hansen, supra note 135, at 161. In a powerful passage, he traces the refugee crisis
in Africa to the post-colonial states, the
direct and uncritical successors of the colonies. Both colony and state are forms
introduced by the Europeans. The colonies and the shapes of colonial territories
that were created by European powers reflect variable penetration by outsiders into
the interior, thwarted and achieved ambitions, and (often intentional) ignorance of
preexisting tribal territories. When African states gained their "independence,"
leaders of these new states assumed the boundaries and internal structures of the
colonies, sometimes with minor cosmetic changes in names (Northern Rhodesia
became Zambia; the Gold Coast became Ghana, etc.). Though they were African
themselves, the leaders ignored African identities, territories, and boundaries in
favor of European-defined ones.
Id. (emphasis added).
138. Id. This point was underscored by Nkrumah in his discussion of neo-colonialism.
Though possessing the trappings of international sovereignty, the post-colonial state's eco-
nomic system and political policy are directed from the outside. See generally NKRUMAH,
supra note 124.
139. Irele has observed that the authoritarianism of the colonial state "was codified in the
colonial legal arsenal with an array of laws that prohibited assembly, restricted movement,
proscribed 'sedition', and so on. (After independence, these laws survived in nearly every
African state and proved to be convenient repressive tools in the hands of the successor
governments.)" Abiola Irele, The Crisis of Legitimacy in Africa, DISSENT, Summer 1992, at
296, 298.
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new African states was creating nations. This task was often re-.
ferred to as creating a national consciousness, but that was mis-
leading. There was no nation to become conscious of,- the na-
tion had to be created concurrently with a consciousness."4
Some scholars have argued that it is an illusion to refer to "the
state" in sub-Saharan Africa.' 4' According to this view, many post-
colonial states in Africa lack an independent political organization with
enough authority and power to govern a people and territory; in other
words, they lack the "essential requirements of empirical statehood."'
142
Neither the governors nor the governed exhibit the consciousness of
civic responsibility:
Citizenship means little, and carries few substantial rights or duties
compared with membership in a family, clan, religious sect or
ethnic community. Often the "government" cannot govern itself,
and its officials may in fact be freelancers, charging what amounts
to a private fee for their services. The language of the state may be
little more than a facade for the advancement of personal or fac-
tional interests by people who are only nominally judges, soldiers,
bureaucrats, policemen or members of some other official category.
In short, many states in sub-Saharan Africa are far from credible
realities. 43
Jackson makes the argument, consequently, that the survival of the
post-colonial states since independence has not been contingent on
internal legitimacy among the populace, for that was non-existent;
rather, he argues, their endurance in that period has been due primarily
to their external or international legitimacy.1" This legitimacy resulted
140. Hansen, supra note 135, at 161-62 (emphasis added).
141. Robert H. Jackson,. Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa, 46 J. INT'L AFF. I
(1992) [hereinafter Juridical Statehood]. For similar analyses, see also ROBERT H. JACKSON,
QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD (1990);
ROBERT H. JACKSON & CARL G. ROSBERG, PERSONAL RULE IN BLACK AFRICA (1982).
142. Juridical Statehood, supra note 141, at 1. He calls them "ramshackle regimes"
whose writ barely extends throughout the country and where it does so, only irregularly. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Clough argues that the rights and privileges enjoyed by African states were
established by imperial powers at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and the San Francisco
Conference in 1945. CLOUGH, supra note 126, at 112-13. After independence, he adds,
"African states have been nourished by international agencies and financial institutions and
protected by one or another of the great powers." Id.
A crucial factor in the maintenance of the post-colonial state has been the alliance of the
political elites with multinational corporations. In 1976, a study of the Kenyan economy
revealed, for example, that half of the capital of the country's main industrial and tourist
firms was foreign-owned, with many of their boards under the chair of local elites. Rafael
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from the right of self-determination granted to the colonial state and
fortified by the logic of the cold war. 145 The ethnic plurality,' and, in
some cases, the duality of the state,.47 have finally caught up with post-
colonial Africa. Absent cold war or neo-colonial international guarantees
to client states, the colonial state is nothing if not a house of cards.' 48 Its
ethnic configuration, an integral legacy of colonization, is a major factor
in its failure. 4 9 Rwanda and Burundi are the two most glaring examples:
the Hutu-Tutsi cleavage has repeatedly caused the visitation of untold
suffering on members of one group by the other."
The use of ethnicity to manipulate electoral processes demonstrates
its destructive influence within the post-colonial state. Although it is
noble, it seems ultimately futile to resist the suggestion that the colonial
state and its successor have failed to inspire loyalty and forge a nation-
Kaplinsky, Capitalist Accumulation in the Periphery - the Kenyan Case Re-examined, 17
REV. Aim. POL. ECON. 83, 97 (1980). As the elites benefit from their alliance with interna-
tional capital, and become more isolated from the people; tensions rise and the state has to
rely on its security forces to contain discontent and popular challenge to its policies. See
COLIN LEYS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEO-COLONIAL-
ISM 1964-1971, at 207 (1975). Financial, military, and development assistance from the West
fostered the survival of the weak but authoritarian post-colonial state. JENNIFER A. WIDNER,
THE RISE OF A PARTY-STATE IN KENYA 14-17 (1992).
145. Juridical Statehood, supra note 141, at 2. Jackson adds that, although international
law denied "international status to the vast majority of traditional African political systems"
and "helped justify colonialism," it ironically is responsible for the creation and protection of
the post-colonial state, an entity that hardly meets the criteria for statehood. Id.
146. Many of the colonial states were ethnically plural. Even Somalia, created out of
combining British with Italian Somaliland, was a plural society in spite of its deceptive
cultural homogeneity. Hussein M. Adam, Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?, in
COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 117, at 69-70. Its competing clans, used so effectively by
Siad Barre, the soldier who ruled from 1969 to 1991, were instrumental in his despotic rule
and the subsequent collapse of the state. Muxamed D. Afrax, The Mirror of Culture: Somali
Dissolution Seen Through Oral Expression, in THE SOMALI CHALLENGE, supra note 129, at
236; Adam, supra, at 71-72.
147. The dual states of Rwanda and Burundi contain the combustible HutulTutsi mix, a
combination fanned into hatred by Belgian colonialism. ARNOLD RIvKIN, NATION-BUILDING
IN AFRICA 189-93 (1969). Mazrui has written that "Rwanda's and Burundi's tragedies are a
combination of ethnic duality, population density, geographic intermingling and the legacies
of colonial and pre-colonial relationships." Mazrui, State as Refugee, supra note 124.
148. During the Cold War, many an African regime was kept alive by either the East or
the West. The military and economic support of Mengistu Haile Mariam's Ethiopia and the
MPLA government in Angola by the Soviet Union, and American support for Mobutu Sese
Seko of Zaire, Samuel Doe of Liberia, and Siad Barre of Somalia was critical in avoiding
state collapse. See Keller, supra note 117, at 128; UNGAR, supra note 21, at 87-120 &
359-72. In Zaire, for example, economic decline and Katangese sub-nationalism led to armed
rebellions in 1977 and 1978. On both occasions, Mobutu relied on the military intervention of
the United States, France, Belgium, and Morocco, another Western client-state, to prevent the
collapse of his government. Makau wa Mutua, Zaire: Decline of the Despot?, 36 AFIR. REP.,
Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 13, 17 [hereinafter Mutua, Zaire].
149. See generally Mazrui, State as Refugee, supra note 124.
150. See supra note 147.
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alistic identity among the elites as well as the popular citizenry. Citizens
as a whole lack an "instinctual and nationalistic bond" to the state;
hence those who become rulers pillage it in league with members of
their ethnic group and resort to massive human rights violations to
repress those they have excluded.'' Even Kenya, one of the most "suc-
cessful" post-colonial states, is a good example of the inability of elites
to develop and pursue a national as opposed to ethnic interest. After
independence from Britain in 1963, the anti-colonial coalition of the
major ethnic groups collapsed in 1966, ostensibly over ideological
differences.'52 In 1975, Kikuyus organized to block Daniel arap Moi, a
Kalenjin, from assuming the office of the president upon Kenyatta's
death. 53 However, the timing of Kenyatta's death and squabbles within
the political elite allowed Moi to assume the presidency. Moi has con-
tinued Kenyatta's legacy: he forced Kikuyus out and replaced them with
Kalenjins who now hold key positions in the civil service and the armed
forces. 154 Ethnicity has become such a powerful currency in Kenyan
politics 155 that in 1992, in the first contested election in over two de-
cades, the parliamentary and presidential vote were split along ethnic
151. Mutua, Redrawing the Map, supra note 13, at 17.
152. The Kenya African National Union (KANU), the nationalist party which led Kenya
to juridical independence, enjoyed the widespread support of the Kikuyu, Luo, and Akamba,
the country's main ethnic groups. Until 1964 when they merged, it was opposed by the Kenya
African Democratic Union (KADU), ostensibly a champion of smaller groups but in reality a
front for British settler and commercial interests. Kenyatta, the country's first president, a
Kikuyu and the leader of the KANU anti-colonial coalition picked Oginga Odinga, a Luo, as
his vice president. The coalition collapsed in 1966 when Odinga left the government to form
the left-wing Kenya Peoples Union (KPU). Many prominent Luo members of parliament left
with him. In 1969, Kenyatta banned the KPU following an anti-government demonstration in
Kisumu, Odinga's ancestral home, in which the security forces shot and killed at least ten
people. He detained Odinga and many of his Luo colleagues, an event that continues to
stigmatize the Luo as an anti-government group to date, even. though Daniel arap Moi, the
current president, is a Kalenjin. For a discussion of the Kikuyu-Luo/Kenyatta-Odinga schism,
see generally LEYS, supra note 144. See also DAVID GILLIES & MAKAU WA MUTUA, A LONG
ROAD TO UHURU: HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN KENYA 10-12 (1993).
153. WIDNER, supra note 144, at 112-18. Moi was then the vice-president and
Kenyatta's health was failing because of old age. Members of the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru
Association (GEMA), a shadow government that masqueraded as a cultural organization, were
determined to retain the presidency within their group. Id.
154. Id.
155. Initially, Moi resisted the pressure to abolish the one-party state and allow open
political competition by arguing that such a process would lead to ethnic conflict and chaos.
Apparently to make good on this promise, Kenya's security forces were implicated in killings
of members of opposition groups resident in the Rift Valley, an area claimed by Moi's group,
the Kalenjins. Joel D. Barkan, Kenya: Lessons from a Flawed Election, 4 J. DEMOCRACY 85,
88 (1993). See also J. Brian Atwood, Kenya's Rigged Election, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 2, 1992, at 19. By some estimates as many as 1,500 Kenyans had been killed in this
ethnic slaughter by 1993. Many more were turned into internal refugees. See AFRICA WATCH,
DIVIDE AND RULE: STATE-SPONSORED ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN KENYA 1 (1993).
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lines. 56 These voting patterns are a bad omen for the future of democra-
cy and may become a cyclical problem in virtually every election.
These difficulties indicate that decolonization was not the same
thing as liberation. It is important to reconsider whether the decoloniza-
tion of the colonial state, as a territorial unit, amounted to the liberation
of the different peoples within those borders and structures. The colonial
state may be no more than a jail; such an entity cannot win the loyalty
of its intimates. As noted by Jackson:
Most sub-Saharan colonies resembled the old Austro-Hungarian
Empire, which consisted of many distinctive subject peoples within
a single state framework. While that empire was broken up into
smaller nation-states to liberate its peoples, this rarely happened in
sub-Saharan Africa. Unlike the nationalities of East Central Europe,
those of sub-Saharan Africa were absolutely denied any fight of
self-determination. Instead, like the Kurds of the Middle East or
certain nationalities of Yugoslavia, they were consigned to the
numerous ranks of peoples who are unrecognized internationally.
Ironically, the sole accepted definition of the right of self-determi-
nation was the former colonial jurisdiction.57
The illegitimacy and failure of the post-colonial state raises serious
questions about the future of political organization in Africa, its sover-
eignty and independence from control and exploitation by outsiders; and
challenges its peoples to design formulae to halt the onset of chaos and
massive suffering, conditions which are inevitable if the pathology of
the state is not addressed. As Mazrui has aptly noted, perhaps real
decolonization is not winning formal independence but the collapse and
156. NATIONAL ELECTIONS MONITORING UNIT, THE MULTI-PARTY GENERAL ELECTIONS
IN KENYA: 29 DECEMBER, 1992 (1993). All the major political parties, including KANU, the
ruling party, drew their support along ethnic lines. The Forum for the Restoration of Democ-
racy-Asili (FORD-A), led by Kenneth Matiba, a Kikuyu, was heavily supported in Central
and Nairobi provinces, two regions with large Kikuyu populations; the Forum for the Restora-
tion of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K), led by Oginga Odinga, a Luo, drew most its support
from the Luo-dominated Nyanza province; and the Democratic Party (DP), led by Mwai
Kibaki, another Kikuyu, got most its support from Central and parts of Eastern province,
areas inhabited by the Kikuyu, Akamba, Meru, and Embu, a coalition of culturally and
linguistically related peoples. KANU had its base in the Rift Valley, Moi home region. Id. As
noted by Barkan, support for the parties in the 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections
was highly concentrated in the ethnic heartlands of each of the four parties. In the Kikuyu-
dominated Central province, for example, Moi managed only a bare 2% of the vote. For an
analysis of the place and the role of ethnicity in Kenya's electoral politics and the 1992
elections, see Barkan, supra note 155, at 97.
157. Juridical Statehood, supra note 141, at 4-5. He notes further that, in some cases,
decolonization handed over former colonies to "favored" and unrepresentative elites from
ethnic groups who were discriminatory and ruled over other groups in "a quasi-colonial
manner." Id. at 5.
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eventual disintegration of the colonial state and its structures.'58 The
colonial order need not, however, be "washed clean with buckets of
blood;' 9 there is an urgency for Africans to fashion a solution to avoid
that horrifying eventuality. I suggest that in principle sovereignty be
returned to pre-colonial entities who should then "trade it in" for con-
sensual map-making to voluntarily create larger democratic entities.
III. THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
PROSPECTS FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMULAE
The invention of the African state by colonialism and the subsequent
misapplication of the right to self-determination are the root causes of
the crisis of the post-colonial state."W The denial of the right to self-
determination 61 is one of the fundamental reasons for the failure of the
state to develop into a cohesive, effective, and functional entity. 62
158. Mazrui, State as Refugee, supra note 124, at 22.
159. Id. at 23. There is no guarantee that the "buckets of blood" will clean the slate.
What becomes of Somalia, Liberia, and Rwanda after their current convulsions is not predict-
able.
160. As I have argued elsewhere in this article, the abolition of sovereign pre-colonial
states and societies and their coercion into single states created entities to which Africans are
not loyal. The granting of the right to self-determination to these colonial territorial entities
robbed pre-colonial entities the chance to separately exercise that right. The result has been
the plundering of the state as different groups and elites within those states seek to manipulate
the state to their advantage at the exclusion of other groups. In other words, the group that
controls the state for that moment attempts or purports to use it as the vehicle for the realiza-
tion of the right to self-determination, a practice that inevitably invites conflict because most
African states are multicultural entities.
161. Self-determination, as a fight exercisable by a people or peoples, arises from the
idea that the state must be based on the consent of the governed. People exercise the right by
choosing, freely, to associate in an entity organized to rule itself. When people make this
choice they express their consent to be so governed. See HAROLD S. JOHNSON, SELF-DETER-
MINATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS 25-30 (1967). See also Abdullahi Ahmed
An-Na'im, The National Question, Secession and Constitutionalism: The Mediation of
Competing Claims to Self-determination, in STATE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: AN AFRICAN
DEBATE ON DEMOCRACY 101, 103 (Issa G. Shivji ed., 1991) [hereinafter STATE AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM]. Conversely, the right to self-determination can be exercised by
disassociation. A people may decide to break away from an existing entity and form its own
state as was recently the case with the republics of the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia.
The recognition of the right to self-determination is the acceptance by the international
community that a people - whether cultural, linguistic, racial, religious, or territorial -
should have the right to identify with each other and to organize politically to determine their
fate. See generally An-Na'im, supra, at 108-11.
162. See Chris C. Mojekwu, International Human Rights: the African Perspective, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 85, 90 (Jack L. Nelson & Vera M.
Green eds., 1980). Mojekwu argues, and I agree with him, that the results of the denial of the
right to self-determination to "various peoples and ethnic nations" of Africa are "vividly
portrayed in the minority separatist movements which in extreme cases have led to civil wars"
in the classic examples of Sudan, Nigeria, Zaire, and Angola. Id. Mojekwu correctly argues
that the West and the United Nations practiced a double standard in granting the right to self-
determination. He argues that whereas the West allowed self-determination for the peoples of
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Political elites have made a number of attempts, some cynical,' 63 others
less so, to address the "multi-national" character of the post-colonial
state.'" The one promising device employed by new states to confront
the problem of multi-ethnicity and self-determination was federalism. 65
the Austro-Hungarian, German, Turkish, and former Russian empires of eastern and south
eastern Europe, it denied the peoples and ethnic groups of Africa the "freedom to choose"
and the "right" to determine their fate by lumping them together within the administrative
units of the European colonial territories. Id. at 89-90.
163. See, e.g., Anyang' Nyong'o, supra note 136, at 3. After independence, many
African elites employed the device of the one-party state as a tool for "nation-building." The
arguments for the one-party state project have been succinctly summarized by Anyang'
Nyong'o as follows:
" the single party would promote national unity;
" people's efforts would be directed towards nation building and not wasted on
politics;
" since people were generally agreed that the government was to engage itself
in development, party politics was not necessary;
" whatever differences would emerge, these could be freely discussed under the
single party regime as democracy and human rights would be practised.
Id. (emphases omitted). One-party states, however, universally dismally failed on all these
counts. The predominant model throughout the post-independence era until the late 1980s,
when it was overwhelmed by demands for democratization, the one-party state acted as a
bandit, robber, and terrorist. As stated by Anyang' Nyong'o,
[n]o one party regime in Africa can boast of democratic practice nor of a good
record on human rights. Sekou Toure's Guinea had its own Gulag Archipelagos;
Mobutu's [Sese Seko] Zaire excelled in repression as a policy of maintaining a
kleptocratic regime in power; Banda's [Hastings Kamuzu] Malawi has been the
best run police state in Africa.
Id.
164. Virtually all African states are multi-national; they are a collection of many pre-
colonial nations. As noted by An-Na'im,
if we define a "nation" simply as a people of common ethnicity and culture, the
term nation state is somewhat a misnomer because it is very rare for the population
of a nation state.to consist of a single nation. In the vast majority of cases, and
universally throughout Africa, the population of the nation state consists of several
"nations."
Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 161, at 101. But pre-colonial African societies "grouped
themselves generally into kinship communities of cultural-nations based on common cultures,
language, customs, and religion." Mojekwu, supra note 162, at 87. The colonial state was
created by "abolishing" pre-colonial state-societies and combining them into one unit. Id. at
88.
165. A "federal government" is defined as "the system of government administered in a
nation formed by the union or confederation of several independent states." BLACK'S LAW
DICTiONARY 611 (6th ed. 1990). In this form of government,
the allied states form a union . . . - not, indeed, to such an extent as to destroy
their separate organization or deprive them of quasi sovereignty with respect to the
administration of their purely local concerns, but so that the central power is
erected into a true national government, possessing sovereignty both external and
internal, - while the administration of national affairs is directed, and its effects
felt, not by the separate states deliberating as units, but by the people of all, in their
collective capacity as citizens of the nation.
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This ex post facto attempt to save the post-colonial state from the threat
of self-determination reveals the two contradictory faces of the African
state: the unavoidable fact that every "nation" within the nation state is
a "state in embryo,"' 66 an entity entitled to exercise its right to self-
determination, on the one hand, and the nation-state as an entity deter-
mined to unite and assimilate into a single culture all nations within it
and therefore negate the multi-culturalism of the state, on the other.' 67
Those who see the African post-colonial nation state as the sole basis
for political organization on the continent argue that these two opposing
faces can be reconciled if the right to self-determination is seen as
"exercisable within, as well as through, the nation state."'168
Africa's experience with federalism has, however, proven a disap-
pointment in so far as it has been unable to give political viability to the
post-colonial state. In post-colonial Africa, federalism has been attempt-
ed in Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, and Nigeria; in each case, it was motivated
by different reasons. 69 Though unpopular with those who controlled the
Id. A federal government is distinguished from a confederation in that the latter "denotes a
league or permanent alliance between several states, each of which is fully sovereign and
independent. . . though yielding to the central authority a controlling power for a few limited
purposes, such as external and diplomatic relations." Id.
166. Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 161, at 103.
167. Many African states have sought to stamp out expressions of ethnicity in cases
where ruling elites are threatened by the harnessing of cultural nationalism. A few examples,
drawn from Schatzberg will suffice. Zaire, for instance, forbid the "open discussion of ethnic
identity" and "outlawed ethnic associations" although Mobutu Sese Seko relied heavily on his
ethnic group to retain power. MICHAEL G. SCHATZBERG, THE DIALECTICS OF OPPRESSION IN
ZAIRE 25 (1988); Mutua, Zaire, supra note 148, at 14, 17. The Central African Republic,
Sierra Leone, and Ghana all attempted to criminalize and prohibit the use of ethnic terms and
identities at one point. Even Siad Bane in Somalia abolished the use of clan identity.
SCHATZBERG, supra, at 25. Schatzberg notes that "[gliven the artificial and culturally plural
nature of most African countries, it is not surprising African leaders almost universally
embrace ideologies of nationalism and nation-building." Id. Paradoxically, the state also uses
ethnicity for educational and occupational purposes but does so on a regional or geographic
basis to maintain the facade of the "allegiance to the mystique of the national State." Id. at 25
(quoting MWABILA MALELA, TRAVAIL ET TRAVAILLEURS AU ZAIRE: ESSAI SUR LA CON-
SCIENCE OUVRIERE DU PROLETARIAT URBAIN DE LUBUMBASHI 106 (1979)).
168. Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 161, at 103. Although An-Na'im acknowledges,
rather reluctantly, that nations may be justified to break away from the nation state and
establish their own nation states, he asserts that the " 'nations' or peoples constituting the
Nation of the nation state need not challenge and overthrow the Nation and its state in order
to satisfy their right to self-determination." Id. at 103--04. This, he argues, can be done
through various constitutional devices, including autonomy regimes for aggrieved groups and
minorities. Id. at 105.
169. Benjamin Neuberger, Federalism in Africa: Experience and Prospects, in FEDERAL-
ISM AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION 171, 172-75 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1979). The founding
fathers of nationalism in Africa, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Milton Obote, Jomo Kenyatta, and
Patrice Lumumba, saw federalism as an external plot by Western countries to weaken the
newly independent African states by further balkanization. They argued that federalism was
inefficient, an invitation to "tribalism," and a waste of resources. It would prevent effective
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state, federalism offered a middle course between separatists and the
advocates of strong unitary central states.' 70 A brief survey of each of
these cases is necessary to demonstrate why federalism failed to take
root in Africa.
In Kenya, the genesis of a federal structure of government grew out
of the fears of ethnic groups such as the Luhyia and the Kalenjin that
the control of a unitary state by the Kikuyu-Luo alliance would deny
them their share of the spoils of independence.' 7 1 KADU, the proponent
of federalism, equated regional autonomy with self-determination and
access to land.' In 1963, the British forced the "Majimbo Constitu-
decision-making and rapid nation-building. British support for such arrangements did nothing
to allay the fears of the nationalists. See id. at 180-82.
170. Neuberger notes that "federalism had an appeal in the late 1950s and early 1960s as
a middle-of-the-road approach between the poles of unitarist centralism and outright seces-
sion. Intra-state federalism was seen as the only way to accommodate tribal and linguistic
diversity within one political system. Federalism within the state was the outcome of devolu-
tion, and thus its function was more to mediate between the ethnic groups than to integrate
them into one uniform whole." Id. at 173 (footnotes omitted).
171. KANU and KADU, the two main political parties that vied for the leadership of
Kenya at independence, represented the political and economic interests of the elites of
particular ethnic communities. A major bone of contention was who would control the
distribution of land within the White Highlands, formerly reserved for white settlers, and the
Rift Valley, Kenya's breadbasket. Both the Kalenjin and the Luhyia, who formed KADU, and
the Kikuyu and Luo, who led KANU, adopted positions which would enhance their chances
of seizing or retaining control over these fertile lands. A federal structure of government
would protect the interests of the weaker KADU and vest it with power over land distribution.
See WIDNER, supra note 144, at 53-54. But British settler and commercial interests were also
supportive of federalism because they stood to lose access to land and other resources if all
state power vested in the "radical" KANU, the party that led the struggle for independence. In
the event, the British government itself, under whose direction the independence negotiations
were conducted, favored a federal structure, in part to protect the interests of its subjects and
curb KANU's "nationalist" fervor which could have threatened its interesti in the newly
independent state. For British support for the formation of KADU, see id. at 216. Neuberger
notes that KANU accepted federalism because the British made it a condition for indepen-
dence. Neuberger, supra note 169, at 175.
172. Peter Okondo, a Luhyia and one of KADU's leaders, argued in 1962 that individual
liberty and the freedom of thought and choice could only be protected under a federal
constitution. He posited that the unitary state favored by KANU would "destroy liberty by
simply imprisoning the opposition and tampering with the courts." Peter J.H. Okondo,
Prospects of Federalism in East Africa, in FEDERALISM AND THE NEw NATIONS OF AFRICA
29, 34 (David P. Currie ed., 1964). The differences between KANU and KADU were
entrenched. "KADU had differed with KANU most significantly in its stance on regional
autonomy and its definition of regional boundaries. Its organizers argued for a federal system
with regional legislatures that could each decide how to regulate access to land. They further
argued for regional jurisdictions that would effectively preclude a significant Kikuyu voice in
the division of the White Highlands." WIDNER, supra note 144, at 54. It is interesting that
Julius Kiano, a well-educated Kikuyu and a leading voice within KANU, acknowledged
Okondo's argument that KADU's position was driven by "fear[s] of domination by numeri-
cally strong ethnic groups such as the Kikuyu." J.G. Kiano, The Emergent East African
Federation, in FEDERALISM AND THE NEW NATIONS OF AFRICA, supra, at 39, 74. Kiano's
unconvincing response to this fear was that "no single tribe will have the power to threaten
such domination" in the proposed federation of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. Id.
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tion," which provided for a quasi-federal structure, as the condition for
independence and the assumption of state power by KANU. 73
Neuberger has summed up Kenya's experience with federalism as
follows:
In Kenya the quasi-federal "Majimbo Constitution," which divided
the country into Regions with their Regional Assemblies, Regional
Civil Service and regional powers, was designed to protect the
small backward ethnic groups from the Kikuyu-Luo alliance. It had
strong support in KADU, which represented the Coastal, Baluhya
and Kalenjin tribes. One of its leaders, Masinde Muliro, saw in
federalism the ideal solution for Africa - because it provides for..
"free association" and prevents "imposed unity." The dominant
Kenya African National Union (KANU) opposed federalism, which
it regarded as a colonial device to strengthen those tribes which did
not participate in the anticolonial national movement, and to weak-
en the position of the "radical" Kikuyu. KANU accepted the
"Majimbo Constitution" because that was the British condition
for independence. It very soon eroded and then abolished the
federal system, and imposed a unitary regime strongly dominat-
ed by the Kikuyu bureaucracy."
Uganda's experimentation with federalism was equally short-lived.
The pre-colonial kingdom of Buganda, one of the most established states
at the time, as well the smaller states of Bunyoro and Ankole, were
granted a type of federal status by the British under the independence
constitution. 175 Less powerful groups, such as the Acholi and Lango of
northern Uganda, organized under Milton Obote and the Uganda Peo-
ple's Congress (UPC), opposed federalism because they resented the
173. Majimbo, the Kiswahili plural for province, connotes the federal character of the
1963 Kenya Constitution under which Kenya became independent. For discussions on the
constitutional and legal changes in early independent Kenya, see Y.P. GHAI & J.P.W.B.
McAUSLAN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA (1970).
174. Neuberger, supra note 169, at 175 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Upon
becoming a republic in 1964, one of KANU's first actions was the abolition of the quasi-
federal system. KENYA CONST. (Constitution Act,. 1964) art. I, reprinted in I ASIAN-AFRICAN
LEGAL CONSULTIVE COMMITTEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF AFRICAN STATES 606-720 (1972); see
generally GHAI & McAUSLAN, supra note 173.
175. UGANDA CONST. OF 1962 § 2(2). Within the federal structure, the kingdoms of
Buganda, Bunyoro, and Ankole retained substantial regional autonomy; they kept their
governments, "lukikos" or parliaments, and their civil services. Neuberger, supra note 166, at
175. Buganda, by far the most populous and powerful of all groups in Uganda, was a
dominant force politically. In 1959, it constituted 16.3% of the population of Ugandan
Africans. Nelson Kasfir, Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Uganda, in THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL
SUB-NATIONALISM IN AFRICA 51, 82 (Victor A. Olorunsola ed., 1972).
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commanding position that the Buganda kingdom continued to enjoy.'17 6
In the end, the UPC was forced to accept a federal system to avoid the
secession of Buganda.'n In 1966, barely four years after independence,
Obote violently destroyed the Buganda Kingdom, abolished the federal
structure, and concentrated power in his hands.7 8 An African state had
failed, once again, to reconcile demands for internal self-determination
with federalism.
In Zaire, formerly the Belgian Congo, the irreconcilable tensions
between separatists, unitarists, and federalists coupled with external
interference almost resulted in the collapse of the state soon after inde-
pendence in 1960.179 Patrice Lumumba and his party, the nationalist
Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), scored a narrow victory over
Joseph Kasavubu's Alliances des Bakongo (ABAKO), a party of the
historic Kongo people. 80 Lumumba advocated a strong unitary state
while Kasavubu and Moise Tshombe, the Katangese leader, called for
either federalism or secession. 8' Failure to agree on the form of govern-
ment led in 1960 to a constitutional crisis, a mutiny, a Belgian-led effort
for the secession of Katanga, and the murder of Lumumba in which
Mobutu Sese Seko, then the army chief of staff, and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency were implicated. 8 2 After a prolonged period of political
chaos and instability, Mobutu formally took power in a military coup in
1965, banned all political activity, and created a highly abusive police
state with all power concentrated in his hands.
8 3
176. The northern Acholi and Lango are classified as Nilotes as opposed to the Buganda
and other southern peoples who are Bantu. In 1959, the Bantu constituted 65.7% of the
population while the Nilotes, the second largest group, only amounted to 14.5%. Kasfir, supra
note 175, at 83.
177. RIVKIN, supra note 147, at 89.
178. Kasfir, supra note 175, at 112-13. The 1966 Uganda Constitution eliminated the
autonomous powers of districts and federal states, merged the office of the President with that
of the Prime Minister, stripped Buganda of any special privileges, and authorized the Presi-
dent to legislate when the parliament was not sitting. On May 20, 1966, the Baganda rejected
the new constitution and ordered the central government to leave Buganda. On May 24, the
government captured the Lubiri (Kabaka's palace) following a fierce battle. Kabaka Mutesa II
fled to England where he died in 1969. See id.
179. See generally KWAME NKRUMAH, CHALLENGE OF THE CONGO (1967).
180. Neuberger, supra note 169, at 176.
181. Id. at 175-76.
182. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ZAIRE: REPRESSION As POLICY
15-17 (1990) [hereinafter ZAIRE REPRESSION]; Stephen Weissman, The CIA and U.S. Policy
in Zaire and Angola, in AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 381 (Rend Lemarchand ed.,
1978).
183. See ZAIRE REPRESSION, supra note 182, at 17.
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Apart from these experiments, federalism has also been tried, with-
out success, in Ethiopia,' the Cameroons,
8 5 and the Mali Federation.'8 6
In 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed Tanzania, a federal republic,
although it preferred to be called a "United Republic.' 8 7 Since then the
"union" has been under constant threat from Zanzibari separatists.' But
the most enduring, though deeply troubled and largely unsuccessful
attempt at federalism has been in Nigeria. Federalism found widespread
support among Nigeria's diverse ethnic and religious communities
because many saw it as the only viable option if the country was to
attain independence as a single unit. 89 The northern Hausa-Fulani
region, the eastern Ibo-dominated area, and the western Yoruba region
all supported some form of a federal arrangement,' 9° a structure which
favored the populous and large but backward north. The south, made up
of Ibos and Yorubas, pushed for the creation of many ethnic-linguistic
states to counterbalance the predominance of the north. ' 1 The inability
of the federal state to create this balance brought Nigeria to the brink of
disintegration in 1966.
The South's impatience with the reluctance of the north to federalize
fully and share power, political dissension and electoral violence in the
west, and official corruption all combined to cause fundamental fissures
in the new federal state.' 2 In January 1966, Eastern, mainly Ibo, army
184. Eritrea, historically, geographically, and culturally part of Ethiopia, is a creation of
Italian colonialism. Established by Italians in 1889 as they sought to take over Ethiopia, it
was taken over by the British after the war from 1941 to 1952 when it was joined with Ethio-
pia through a federation engineered by the United Nations. G.A. Res. 390 (V), U.N. GAOR,
5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/1605 (1950). In 1962 Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea outright, making
it a part of the unitary state of Ethiopia. See also Ashmelash Beyene, The Nationality
Question, Secession and Constitutionalism: The Case of Ethiopia, in STATE AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 161, at 129; see generally JAMES FIREBRACE, NEVER KNEEL
DowN (1984). That annexation ended in 1991 with the defeat of Ethiopia in the war of
secession.
185. The two halves of Cameroon, one colonized by the French, the other by the British,
were federated into the Federal Republic of Cameroon. See RIVKIN, supra note 147, at 97-99.
186. The Mali Federation sought to bring together Senegal and Mali or the French
Soudan. See Neuberger, supra note 169, at 177.
187. Id.
188. In 1990, for example, the government of Tanzania carried out a severe crackdown
of separatist elements on the Zanzibari island of Pemba who were actively agitating for a
referendum on the union. HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1991 409 (1992). See also Issa G. Shivji, State and Constitutionalism: A New Democratic
Perspective, in STATE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 161, at 27, 34.
189. RIVKIN, supra note 147, at 100.
190. Neuberger, supra note 169, at 174.
191. Id.
192. RIVKIN, supra note 147, at 107-08.
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officers took advantage of this crisis to stage the country's first coup
d'etat in which northern leaders were killed. 93 This ended the country's
experiment with democracy. Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, an easterner
and the head of the National Military Government, issued a decree
replacing the federal structure with a unitary one. 94 Many northerners
protested the coup and the decree, leading to riots in which many Ibos
were massacred in the north.195 In another coup on July 29, 1966, Ironsi
was abducted on a tour of the north and killed by northerners along with
the Ibo officers accompanying him.196 The leader of the coup, Lieutenant
Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a northerner, immediately rescinded the decree
abolishing federalism, although this act did not stop the mass slaughter
and expulsion of Ibos from the north. 97 Fearful of northern domination
and the pogroms, the easterners, under Lieutenant Odumwengu Ojukwu,
the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, declared the secession of the
region as the Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967.98 Although Biafra
was defeated and returned to Nigeria, the country remains precariously
perched on the precipice, unable to create a democratic, internally
legitimate state out of the federal system. Competing religious, regional,
and ethnic interests threaten Nigeria's survival as a state to this day.
If Nigeria is taken as the most "successful" example of federalism in
Africa, the device appears to be doomed as a means for satisfying
demands for self-determination within the post-colonial state. In Africa
where, with the exception of large urban centers, ethnicity usually
corresponds to ancestral land, federalism may have seemed like the
magic solution for resolving or containing within the post-colonial state
the desires of pre-colonial entities for independence and self-governance.
Instead, federalism collapsed or failed to function effectively wherever it
was attempted. These failures occurred not because rulers thought that
the unitary, non-federal, state was better but because the practice of it
could not ensure equity, liberty, and prosperity, conditions that would
193. Victor A. Olorunsola, Nigeria, in THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL SUB-NATIONALISM
IN AFRICA, supra note 175, at 5, 32.
194. UMA 0. ELEAZU, FEDERALISM AND NATION-BUILDING 6 (1977); Decree No. 39,
May 24, 1966, Nigerian Official Gazette, Supp. A153, cited in Olorunsola, supra note 193, at
46.
195. Olorunsola, supra note 193, at 33.
196. Id. at 34.
197. Id.
198. RIVKIN, supra note 147, at 110. Federal troops were rushed in to crush the rebellion
but a prolonged war in which thousands were killed only came to an end on January 12,
1970. See Ijalaye, supra note 118, at 551.
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only have been possible under a democratic regime.' Since the post-
colonial state failed to internalize democracy, it could not be expected to
be the fair arbiter of competing ethnic-based claims. Furthermore, the
trauma inflicted on African peoples by the post-colonial state has been
so disorienting that their loss of faith in it is irretrievable. The cynical
manipulation of ethnic identities aside, federalism was not viable in
Kenya, Uganda, or Zaire because the post-colonial state did not offer a
forum for mediating the fears of groups subject to it. Those in power,
usually drawn from one group, saw federalism as an attempt to weaken
their grip2" while those vying for power, drawn from other groups, saw
it as an "equalizer," a tool to prevent domination and retain autonomy
over their own affairs. In any case, groups saw the struggle to control
the state as a zero-sum game in which all the spoils belonged to the
victor. This view has some truth, as each group saw the capture of state
power as the only vehicle for the realization of the right to self-determi-
nation for its people, at the exclusion, and often the expense, of other
groups. Local, as opposed to European, colonialism has often been the
result of such exclusionary practices.
The recent attempt at federalism in Ethiopia and calls for it in South
Africa20 ' may lead to a revival of the federalist argument although none
199. The success of the multinational post-colonial state would require the democratic
treatment of all nations within it as well as an end to the oppression of such nations by
dominant ruling elites. Achievement of these conditions appears impossible because of the
uneven regional development within the colonial and the post-colonial state. As an artificial
and imposed creation, the state has largely served only the interests of the international
system and those of local elites. As such, it not only failed to forge a "national identity"
among the populace but also completely alienated them though exploitation and the use of
force. Illegitimacy and alienation are so deeply ingrained that successful nation-building
within the post-colonial state is a virtual impossibility at this point. Although Shivji, for
example, holds out hope for federalism and democracy in the context of the post-colonial
state, he does not, short of rehearsing abstract constitutional devices, say how or why the
African masses and their elites would pull the post-colonial state back from the brink. See
generally Shivji, supra note 188.
200. The exception is northern Nigeria which, because of its numerical superiority,
favored federalism because it would gave it influence and control over the more "modern"
south. See Neuberger, supra note 169, at 174; see also notes 189-98 and accompanying text.
201. Whatever one thinks of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the self-anointed leader of the Zulu
nation, South Africa's most populous group, it became clear in the period leading to the
country's first democratic vote in 1994 that his manipulation of Zulu history in aid of claims
for autonomy and personal power could not be ignored. Although the South African Interim
Constitution attempted to accommodate traditional authorities in the post-Apartheid political
arrangement, Buthelezi has been pressing for a federal system. For the role granted to
traditional authorities, see Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic South
Africa Bill, Chapter 11 (1994). Recently, Buthelezi has reiterated his demands:
[w]e left no stone unturned in our fight for a constitutional settlement which
would reflect the complexities of our society along the lines of federalism and
pluralism. Our diverse society may not survive under a unitary government. The
very nature of South Africa requires different governments for different regions
with full political autonomous powers.
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, A Crossroad in South African History and Western Policies Towards
South Africa, 2 BRowN J. WORLD AFF. 231, 236 (1994). Even if the South African govern-
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of these cases look promising thus far. The Transitional Government of
Ethiopia (TGE),2  the entity that overthrew Mengistu Haile Mariam's
Dergue in 1991, was based on an interim constitution that provided to
all nations, nationalities, and peoples the "right to self-determination of
independence.'203 This provision was the natural outcome of the repres-
sion of Tigrayans, Eritreans, and Oromos by the regimes of Haile
Selassie and Mengistu Haile Mariam. For these groups, the discourse of
self-determination - including secession from Amhara-controlled
Ethiopia - had become standard fare.2' In apparent recognition of this
history of animosity between groups, the newly adopted constitution
creates a federal system with nine federal states, each dominated by a
single ethnic group.2 5 The constitution affirms the right of nationalities
to establish their own federal states. 206 All major opposition groups have
either been excluded from the political process or have refused to partic-
ipate due to the belief that the Tigrayan-controlled TGE is not genuine
about its claims of federalism and democratization.2 7 In all likelihood,
this latest attempt at federalism is also doomed.
ment relents on this issue, it is unlikely that a fully fledged federal system would be tried
because of its failure elsewhere on the continent and its association with the racist policy of
homelands under Apartheid.
202. In May 1991, the combined forces of the Tigreyan Peoples Democratic Front
(TPLF) and the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), overthrew the government of
Mengistu Haile Mariam which had itself overthrown Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. EPLF,
which for years had fought for separate statehood, immediately established a separate entity in
Eritrea and in 1993 became a sovereign state. In July 1991, the National Conference chaired
by Meles Zenawi, head of TPLF, adopted the Transitional Charter, an interim constitution, to
govern the country until a government was popularly elected. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW GROUP, ETHIOPIA IN TRANSITION: A REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 1 (1994). On December 8, 1994 the Constituent Assembly adopted a new
constitution for Ethiopia. Constituent Assembly Ratifies New Constitution, 3 NEWS FROM
ETHIOPIA, Dec. 26, 1994, at I [hereinafter NEws FROM ETHIOPIA].
203. ETH. CONST. (Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, 1991), art. 2(c), reprinted in
TECOLA W. HAGos, DEMOCRATIZATION? ETHIOPIA (1991-1994): A PERSONAL VIEW app. VII,
at 318 (1995).
204.. Ethiopia's three largest nationalities are the Oromos, the Amhara, and Tigrayans,
who together constitute 67% of the population. Of these the Oromos are the largest and the
Tigrayan the smallest. See Beyene, supra note 184, at 130.
205. See NEws FROM ETHIOPIA, supra note 201, at 2.
206. ETH. CONST., supra note 203, art. 47. Although the government claims that it has
granted ethnic groups limited autonomy as well as the right to secede from Ethiopia, in reality
the system has created an arrangement similar to the British colonial policy of "indirect rule"
where collaborators enforced the harsh policies of an authoritarian state. See Makau wa
Mutua, The Regionalization Controversy, AFR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 30, 31; see generally
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, supra note 202.
207. The TGE has excluded all independent groups from the transitional process and
engaged in massive human rights violations to retain political power. As a consequence,
opposition groups have refused to recognize the Tigrayan-controlled TGE and called for
international mediation. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD
REPORT 1995 16-21 (1995); See also Makau wa Mutua, The Anointed Leadership, AFR. REP.,
Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 31-34.
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Other autonomy regimes for minorities within the post-colonial state
in Africa may not fare any better. Two other types of autonomy regimes
identified by Steiner offer little hope. The first is power-sharing regimes
in which a state's population is carved up in "ethnic terms to assure one
or several ethnic groups of a particular form of participation in gover-
nance or economic opportunities. '2am An example would be the entitle-
ment for members of group X to elect a stated percentage of members
of the national parliament. Finally, the constitution could provide that a
certain group be governed by personal law unique to it, such as a Hindu
minority in Kenya.2' Although the first model has not been tried, it is
unlikely to succeed because in the winner-take-all politics of the post-
colonial state, it may consign a numerically small group to the fringes of
society. The second model may be irrelevant because it is unlikely to
result in political power, the variable that is the basis for self-determina-
tion.
What these examples demonstrate is the inability of the post-colonial
state to act as the forum on which claims and demands for self-determi-
nation can be exercised by pre-colonial entities or nations within the
nation state.
IV. NEW MAP-MAKING: QUESTIONS OF LAW AND POLITICS
The post-colonial state is, in concept and substance, the colonial
state in another guise. Just as the colonial state was created by foreign-
ers to benefit them, its existence over the last four decades was guaran-
teed by those same foreigners because it served the cruel logic of the
Cold War.2 0 In other words, since their creation in the late nineteenth
208. See Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over Autonomy
Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1541 (1991).
209. Id.
210. For most of the Cold War era, African states were aligned either with the West
(France, Britain or the United States) or the Soviet Union, powers that continually sought to
marginalize each other in African capitals. As a general rule, the conduct of an African state
towards its own citizens did not affect the level of support from the superpowers as long as
the government maintained a clientilist posture. Examples abound on the continent. The
French interventionism in virtually all its pro-Western former colonies is a classic case. As
aptly noted by Young, the "political, cultural, economic, and military connection Paris has
maintained with the erstwhile bloc africain de l'empire [seventeen sub-Saharan states] has
been frequently tutelary, often intrusive, and sometimes overtly interventionist." Young, supra
note 6, at 27. Except in a few places such as Kenya, British influence largely diminished after
independence. Id. at 26-27. In contrast, American involvement increased, particularly in the
Horn of Africa, and in Angola, Zaire, and South Africa, mainly to counter Soviet penetration.
For accounts of U.S. involvement in southern Africa, see JOHN STOCKWELL, IN SEARCH OF
ENEMIES: A CIA STORY (1978); CHESTER A. CROCKER, HIGH NOON IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:
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century, African states have been outposts of the world powers, decolo-
nization notwithstanding. Even in cases of extreme distress, they were
not allowed to fail. 21I External border challenges were illegitimized by
the major powers to maintain the inherited state system.212 The end of
the Cold War, however, resulted in the flight of Western collaborators,
and for the first time in history the pirates 213 in power were left exposed.
In the aftermath, the fragility of the post-colonial state has been un-
masked by its failure and, in several instances, collapse.
There is a clear need to confront the nature of the African state
urgently, demystify it, and address the problem of legitimacy pressing it.
While alienation of the African state from its citizens is not merely the
function of the loss of sovereignty over pre-colonial structures - it is
also a crisis of cultural214 and philosophical identity215 - the two phe-
nomena are linked like Siamese twins. I believe that the crisis in Africa
MAKING PEACE IN A TOUGH NEIGHBORHOOD (1992). Soviet bloc support for its clients in
Africa was no less spirited.
211. For an example, after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in 1974,
the unwelcome Americans traded places with the Soviets in Somalia, ensuring that each state
had a patron. UNGAR, supra note 21, at 365-67. France went even further. It had troops
permanently stationed in Djibouti, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and
Senegal; a rapid deployment force specifically designed for Africa was always on alert in
France. Young, supra note 6, at 28. As Clough notes, the "main effect of international
involvement in Africa in the postindependence era has been to assist African rulers to
consolidate their power and insulate themselves from the demands and pressures of civil
society." CLOUGH, supra note 126, at 113.
212. Jeffrey Herbst, Challenges to Africa's Boundaries in the New World Order, 46 J.
INT'L AFF. 17, 19 (1992). Herbst notes that the patronage of the major powers during the
Cold War saved a number of client states from collapse. "Thus, Zaire won crucial aid from
the United States in turning back the Shaba rebellions [1977 and 1978], Chad relied on
France to retain its territorial integrity in the face of Libyan aggression, and Ethiopia was
given critical military support by the Soviet Union in order to resist Somalia's irredentist
claims." Id.
213. Davidson uses the term "pirates" to describe the alienated, kleptocratic ruling elites,
from Samuel Doe of Liberia to Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. See BASIL DAVIDSON, THE
BLACK MAN'S BURDEN 243-65 (1992).
214. Davidson's description of the pathology of the abusive and despotic elite is partially
rooted in the cultural disconnection of post-colonial rulers. Describing rulers such as Samuel
Doe [ruler of Liberia before his murder by rebel forces in 1990], Davidson notes that al-
though such men are "children of their ancestral cultures," they are also "the product of an
alienation which rejects those cultures, denies them moral force, and overrides their impera-
tives of custom and constraint." DAVIDSON, supra note 213, at 246. Pre-colonial cultures
"possessed rules and regulations for the containment and the repression of abusive violence;
and these were the rules and regulations, before the scourge of the slave trade and colonialism
that followed it, that enabled them to evolve their sense and value of community." Id. at 247.
215. Writing on the problem of political legitimacy, Irele has noted "[c]olonialism was a
transformative trauma, signaling a moment of profound historical discontinuity for Africans.
In all spheres of life a new paradigm was imposed .... The nation-state was its political and
territorial expression." Irele, supra note 139, at 299.
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can only be addressed through a dual but simultaneous process of new
map-making together with norm re-examination and reformulation,
which will reconnect the continent to many of the pre-colonial ideals of
community and social organization as well as democratization. It will
not suffice to democratize the post-colonial state; as a fundamentally
undemocratic entity in concept and reality, it is incapable of genuine
democratization. Africa's political map must first be unscrambled and
the post-colonial state disassembled before the continent can move
forward. Put differently, the form and physical substance of the colonial
state must be completely dismantled; otherwise, its tightening noose will
strangle the entire continent. Instead of false decolonization, whose
purpose has been to preserve European Africa, 16 new map-making
would, as a first step, liberate the peoples of Africa by theoretically
returning sovereignty to their pre-colonial political identities and asking
them to consensually and voluntarily create new, democratic, larger
political entities. For this purpose, a new map of Africa must be drawn.
There is little doubt that the call for a new map to abolish the
colonial state would be greeted by ruling elites with hostility, if not
worse. The continent's post-colonial elites have a long history of sensi-
tivity to any suggestion that the question of colonial boundaries be
opened. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity, adopted in
1963, validated the colonial state as the basic unit for self-determina-
tion.2"7 Even before the ink on the Charter was dry, the OAU was faced
with a number of border disputes. In 1964, fighting broke out between
Somalia and Ethiopia over the disputed Ogaden region of Ethiopia,
home to ethnic Somalis. 218 A similar dispute between Kenya and Soma-
lia broke out over Kenya's northeastern province, also inhabited by
Somalis." 9 In both instances, Somalia was driven by a desire to unite all
Somalis under one state.22° Although the Somali-Kenya-Ethiopia border
216. 1 use the term "European Africa" to denote the alienation of post-colonial Africa
from Africans. For a discussion of the state in Africa as an exploitative, oppressive instrumen-
tality, see SCHATZBERG, supra note 167, at 11-29.
217. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY arts. II-III. Article II commits
the organization "to defend their [African states] sovereignty, their territorial integrity and
independence." Id. art. I1, 1 1(c). Article III requires OAU member states to "solemnly affirm
and declare their adherence to" the principle of "respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence." Id. art. III, 1 3.
218. SAADIA ToUVAL, THE BOUNDARY POLITICS OF INDEPENDENT AFRICA 216 (1972).
219. BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 889.
220. TOUVAL, supra note 218, at 212-45.
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disputes were irredentist or ethnic, that was the exception, not the
rule.22' Morocco and Algeria were also embroiled in another boundary
dispute.222
Against this backdrop, the OAU summit of the Heads of State and
Government met in Cairo, Egypt in July 1964 to address the problem of
borders.223 It adopted a key historical resolution which affirmed the
borders existing at independence,' 4 with the exception of Somalia and
Morocco;' it in effect legitimized the status quo of colonial bound-
aries.1 6 According to one view, the object of the resolution "was realis-
tic enough: decolonization was not to be the occasion for new sources of
doubt and controversy. ' 27 An elaboration of this view emphasizes
stability and order:
The policy behind the resolution is clear enough. If the colonial
alignments were discarded, alternative alignments would have to be
agreed upon. Such a process of redefinition would create confusion
and threats to the peace. Even if the principles on which revision
was to be based were agreed upon, there would be considerable
221. BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 12. Border disputes in post-
colonial Africa have rarely been triggered by ethnic considerations. The dispute between
Tanzania and Malawi at Lake Nyasa was a result of the struggle over the lake and its
resources, especially water. Id. at 965. The war between Tanzania and Uganda in 1979, which
resulted in Idi Amin's ouster from power, was precipitated by Amin's purported annexation of
his border region with Tanzania. Id. at 1015. Amin's claim was a cynical ploy intended to
reunite his army against an external enemy and "divert attention from his internal troubles and
cover up the massacre of dissident troops." AVIRGAN & HONEY, supra note 126, at 51.
222. BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 55-83.
223. TouVAL, supra note 218, at 86.
224. Id. at 86-88.
225. Id. Morocco and Somalia were involved in border disputes with Algeria and Kenya
and Ethiopia, respectively. They argued that the resolution should only apply to future
disputes. BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 11.
226. Border Disputes Among African States, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON AFRI-
CAN AFFAIRS 360-61 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1971) [hereinafter Brownlie, BASIC DOCUMENTS].
The Cairo OAU resolution on border disputes was prefaced with several warnings: "border
problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension"; and the "existence of extra-
African manceuvers aiming at dividing African states." It stated that "the borders of African
States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality." Id. In the resolution,
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government:
1. Solemnly reaffirms the strict respect by all Member States of the Organiza-
tion for the principles laid down in Article III, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the
Organization of African Unity [respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity];
2. Solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the
frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence.
Id.; see also Peter, supra note 84, at 125 n.27 referring to OAU Doc. AHG/Res. 16(1).
227. BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 11. The resolution, adds
Brownlie, was "aimed at prevention of irredentist policies and the fostering of separatist
movements." Id.
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difficulty in applying the principles to the ethnic and tribal com-
plexities of African societies.
228
Writing about Nigeria, Anene agrees with this view on the basis that "it
is utterly unrealistic to suggest revisions" of international boundaries
because "[n]o one can sanely contemplate mass population transfers."2 9
While there is obvious truth to this position, there was another
sinister motive for the Cairo resolution: post-colonial ruling elites and
the Cold War system stood to lose power, access to resources, and the
ability to manipulate in the small and shallow pond of the post-colonial
state. Although the commitment by the African elite to colonial state
system is paradoxical, if not ironic, the convergence of the interests of
local rulers2 30 and their international patrons23' completely overwhelmed
any meaningful discussion about the need for African unity within larger
entities. 32 Some of the states, however, preferred confederations while
the Francophone countries, perhaps due in no small measure to their
linkage to France, favored "gradualism" and "solidarity" to political
integration.233
Without a doubt, the one successful enterprise of the post-colonial
system in Africa has been the endurance of colonial boundaries. This
has been accomplished by the development of two related concepts: the
elimination of the concept of self-determination with respect to indepen-
dent states, which avoids and delegitimizes separatist movements, and
the application of the principle of self-determination only to colonial or
racist minority regime situations. Beginning in 1957, the colonial state
was so secured over the entire Cold War period that any boundary
changes were consensual. 34 In the period between 1957 and 1990 only
228. Id.
229. ANENE, supra note 7, at 290-91.
230. Boundary changes threaten every ruling elite in Africa. There is no guarantee that
cliques would stay in power if new border configurations were implemented. See Herbst,
supra note 212, at 19.
231. Id. at 20. Herbst has written that
the interests of African leaders and those of the great powers were almost identical
on the issue of boundary stability. Africans and the global community provided not
only the arms but also a legal framework, in the form of international sovereignty,
to justify African leaders taking almost any step to crush local rebellions.
Id.
232. Kwame Nkrumah, for one, expounded political unification of Africa. See KWAME
NKRUMAH, AFRICA MUST UNITE (1970).
233. BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 10.
234. Herbst, supra note 212, at 18.
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military insurgency in independent Africa was successful.23 5 But in the
last several years, a number of governments and states have been al-
lowed to fail.
236
In real terms, the end of the Cold War means that African states
now have to fend for themselves, a task for which they are ill-prepared
in their current configuration. Local pressures for democratization and
better livelihood have intensified at a time when the patrons are becom-
ing isolationist, pulling away from their traditional support of the
state.23'7 New experiments with democracy may turn sour before they
start in earnest. With economic decline at record levels, this confluence
of factors could not have materialized at a worse time. The moral and
legal illegitimacy of the colonial state have finally caught up with the
continent. Either colonial Africa must be unscrambled or the failure of
the state will usher in anarchy.238
The inability of the post-colonial state to serve citizens has dimin-
ished its sovereignty in the eyes of African masses. Instead, the state is
now under attack from another norm, that of the right to self-determina-
tion, meaning the right of a people to democratic government. Social
and ethnic groups are beginning to question why loyalty should be owed
to a bankrupt, abusive, and illegitimate entity. In 1968, when Tanzania
recognized Biafra as an independent sovereign state, it argued that since
Nigeria had failed the Ibos, they owed it no loyalty.239
235. While military coups were common, armed insurrections have not been supported
by the international system. The exception was the 1986 military victory by Yoweri Museveni
over the Obote regime after a long and costly civil war. Id. at 21. The secessionist struggle in
Eritrea only succeeded after the end of the Cold War and the inability of the Soviets to
continue supporting Mengistu Haile Mariam. A similar struggle in southern Sudan has not
received international legitimacy.
236. Id. The failure of governments in Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Chad
would have been very unlikely during the cold war. Id.
237. For example, the U.N. mission to Somalia, justified by the Bush Administration on
humanitarian grounds, ended in March 1995, without establishing a government. The mission,
launched in 1992 after the collapse of the Somali state, was initially meant to halt starvation
but eventually turned into a peace-keeping/making mission. Clashes between Somali groups
and the mission, and its inability to restore government hastened donor fatigue and the
withdrawal. Lessons From Somalia, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 1995, at 10.
238. For a disturbing analysis of the crisis of the state and the great potential for its
collapse, see Aristide Zolberg, The Specter of Anarchy, DISSENT, Summer 1992, at 303.
239. After the massacre of some 30,000 Ibos in two pogroms, Biafra sought to secede
from Nigeria, an event that precipitated a bloody war that ended in Biafra's defeat in 1970.
See Ijalaye, supra note 118. Tanzania stated that "[w]hen the state ceases to stand for the
honour, the protection, and the well being of all its citizens, then it is no longer the instru-
ment of those it has rejected. In such a case, the people have the right to create another
instrument for their protection - in other words, to create another state." The Tanzania
Government's Statement on the Recognition of Biafra, Apr. 13, 1968, in FOREIGN POLICY OF
TANZANIA 1961-1981: A READER 275, 278 (K. Mathews & S. Mushi eds., 1981).
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Today, the relationship between the post-colonial state and the
citizenry is reminiscent of that Nigerian tragedy. As demands for inter-
nal self-determination soar, sovereignty diminishes, and the commitment
of the average African to colonial borders weakens.2" The distress of
the state has broken what Mazrui calls the "[t]hree post-colonial ta-
boos."241 These are: the taboo of recolonization, with the U.N. tutelage
of Somalia to reinvent its self-government; the taboo of sanctioned
secession, with the creation of sovereign Eritrea; and the taboo of
"retribalization," with the creation of a "federal" system in Ethiopia
based on ethnicity.242 Mazrui posits that external recolonization may be
tried under the banner of humanitarianism, as the cases of Somalia and
Liberia suggest. 3 Otherwise, failed states may be taken over in a new
trusteeship system dominated by stable states in Africa and Asia.244 He
indicates that the rise of ethnic consciousness and the "politicised tribal
identity" in the context of multipartyism is another reason for the review
of another scared cow, a taboo, that of addressing ethnicity with federal-
ism. 241 Significantly, Mazrui sees the "decolonization" of colonialboundaries as inevitable:
Over the next century the outlines of most of present-day African
states will change in one of two main ways. One will be ethnic
self-determination, which will create smaller states, comparable to
the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia. The other will be regional
integration, towards larger political communities and economic
unions.2
If African peoples and governments, including the OAU, do not
move quickly to liberate the post-colonial state by creating new consen-
sual political entities to replace the colonial state, Mazrui's prediction of
the continent's break-up of the colonial state into ministates will proba-
bly come true. Without a peaceful formula for self-determination of pre-
colonial peoples and societies, such a prediction will probably come at
great cost to human life. But it is not inevitable that the eventual decolo-
nization and liberation of Africa will be fed on yet more African blood.
As Davidson so correctly writes:
240. See Herbst, supra note 212, at 24-25.
241. Ali Mazrui, The Bondage of Boundaries, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1993, § 2, at 28.
242. Id.
243. Mazrui, supra note 241, at 28.
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What the analysis then goes on to demand, all things being so, is
the invention of a state appropriate to a postimperialist future. To
those who prudently reply that it can't be done, the answer will be
that it can certainly be thought of. Cases spring to mind. It was
already beginning to be thought of, even during the dreadful 1980s,
in the projects of the sixteen-country Economic Community of
West African States, and potentially again, in those of the nine-
country Southern African Development Coordination, Conference
launched a little later. Each set of projects has supposed a gradual
dismantlement of the nation-statist legacy derived from imperial-
ism, and the introduction of participatory structures within a wide
regionalist framework.247
Y. REGIONAL INTEGRATION: ANOTHER DEAD END
Davidson's cautious optimism2 s in the notion of regional integration
as a hopeful sign for new conceptions about a viable state, one that
repudiates the self-destructive impulses of the post-colonial state, is a
deterrent against easy refuge in regionalism as a panacea for Africa's
political and economic crises. Like the post-colonial state itself, theories
of regional integration originated in the West and have been imported
into Africa and other regions of the South. 9 Though their foreign origin
certainly does not invalidate their applicability to Africa, Gambari warns
that an evaluation of such "received theories" is necessary to determine
their relevance. 250 This assertion is particularly true for Africa because of
its weak states and underdeveloped economies, two conditions that
militate against traditional conceptions of regional integration.
The two traditional theories of regional integration, which I state
here very simply, will suffice to demonstrate the difficulties of their
application in the underdeveloped states of Africa. The first, the func-
tionalist theory of integration, is a development of nineteenth century
Europe and is based on the assertion that "the development of interna-
tional economic and social cooperation is a major prerequisite for the
247. DAVIDSON, supra note 213, at 321-22.
248. Id.
249. See IBRAHIM A. GAMBARI, POLITICAL AND COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF ECOWAS 2 (1991). Gambari locates the "intellectual origins" of
the integration schemes in the creation of particular European entities such as the European
Coal and Steel Community and the establishment of the European Economic Community
through the Treaty of Rome. Id.
250. Id.
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ultimate solution of political conflicts and elimination of war."25'
Functionalism stems from the basic assumption that war is caused by
three factors: (1) poverty or economic misery, social injustice, hatred,
and discrimination; (2) the institutional inadequacy of the state system,
which is inefficient and cannot adequately solve economic and social
problems because it imposes separateness through sovereignty and
prevents other authorities from solving these problems; and, (3) thoughts
and feelings fostered by the state. 2 Functionalism, therefore, seeks to
overcome these factors by creating horizontal links and avoiding the
vertical divisions of nation states. It focuses attention upon areas of
common interest and away from the conflictual character of the state.253
The second theory, known as the customs union theory, is premised
on the creation of arrangements for the gradual removal of "discrimina-
tions that may exist in trade and general economic relationships across
national boundaries. ' '2 ' It assumes that increased free trade among
nations promotes the more efficient use of resources within the customs
union that, in turn, produces prosperity. Like functionalism, the customs
union theory seeks to intensify inter-state contact in the economic sphere
through a supranational body. They both assume a developed market
economy with a healthy industrial base. Though seemingly anti-statist,
both theories are in fact only realizable where states are legitimate,
stable, and willing to transfer a fraction of their sovereignty to the new
organization.
Gambari makes the argument, which this author agrees with, that
traditional integration theories are of little relevance to Africa because
they assume conditions that do not exist. He writes that:
in assessing the relevance of the conventional notions of integra-
tion to the less developed countries, we may immediately observe
that the conditions favorable to trade creation are the very opposite
to those found in these countries. For example, intra-group trade is
a minor proportion of the total trade between member states and
the rest of the world .... Most developing countries are primary
producers and their products are competitive rather than comple-
mentary. Moreover, developing countries are heavily dependent on
the export of their primary products, while they import intermedi-
251. INIs L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 379 (4th ed. 1971).
252. Id. at 381-82.
253. Id. at 382.
254. GAMBARI, supra note 249, at 4.
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ate manufactures which, insofar as they are produced at all in the
region, are produced in very limited quantities and varieties. 5
The attack on these theories has also been driven by fears that
regionalism, at least in its traditional variant, would diminish state
sovereignty and curb the ability of ruling elites to control and harness
resources to their advantage. That opposition is usually, though not
always, veiled in nationalist jargon. Since ruling elites equate their
control of the state with national development, any attempt to reduce the
authority of the state is suspect. As Gambari again puts it:
Neither the intellectual origin nor the principal goal of function-
alism (in its original or revised form) has much relevance to inte-
gration efforts in the Third World. The role of the sovereign state
is recognized in all integration efforts in developing countries.
Moreover, the principal motivation for integration efforts by these
countries is not the issue of war and security but rather the pursuit
of wealth and enhanced national prosperity.m
Gambari is right in his identification of incompatibility between
traditional integration theories and developing countries. However, he
mistakenly assigns patriotism and conceptions of a national interest to
the reluctance of African elites to apply those theories in their efforts at
regional integration. His assertion that "[w]hat the policymakers in these
regions [South] really want is an escape from or, at least, a change in
the present dependency relationships between their countries and the
industrial North"257 gives too much credit to rulers whose survival was
made possible by that dependency throughout the entire Cold War
period." This is not to say that all African leaders have been cynical
charlatans or that none of them have attempted to wrest free of the
control of the industrial North and its institutions of financial hegemony.
Some, such as the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, believed firmly that
only continental political and economic unity would rescue Africa from
255. Id. at 7-8.
256. Id. at 3.
257. Id. at 13-14.
258. Many leaders in the so-called Third World, from Latin America to Asia and Africa,
owed their existence to financial and military support of either the Soviet or the American
bloc. Leaders such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, for example, came to power with the assis-
tance of the American CIA. Governments in Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, and elsewhere in
Africa and the Middle East were little more than outposts for superpower interests. It is
difficult to see how such rulers or regimes would earnestly have wanted to end their depen-
dent relationship with the North.
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centuries of foreign occupation, control, and exploitation. 9 Yet al-
though quite a number of leaders held similar views, and felt humiliated
by their client relationships with former colonial powers, they came to
rely on that patronage as the only defense against an alienated and
impoverished populace. Nevertheless many of them joined South-South
forums where obligatory denunciations of one or other superpower were
commonplace. 260 The OAU was the classic example of such a forum.
26'
While the traditional conceptual designs of regional integration were ill-
suited to Africa, the admission must be made that the continent also
lacked the leadership necessary for the creation of viable processes and
institutions for integration.
The examples of two significant regional integration efforts illustrate
the inability of that vehicle to give legitimacy to the post-colonial state
and demonstrate the failure of the concept in the context of the existing
state system. The most advanced of these regional integration efforts in
Africa and possibly throughout the South was the East African Commu-
nity (EAC), the regional organization linking Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania.262 Started in 1948 as the East African High Commission by
Britain, the colonial power over the three states, the organization was
intended to harness the region's resources for the benefit of the white
settler minority in Kenya and the British economy.263 Built around a
customs union, free trade in local produce, and a common currency, the
High Commission sought the creation of a regional economy dominated
259. KWAME NKRUMAH 116-17 (Panaf Books ed. 1974).
260. As correctly put by Onwuka and Sesay, "[tlhe established African response to
colonialism and underdevelopment has been advocacy of nationalism at the state level, Pan-
Africanism at the continental level and nonalignment at the Third World level." THE FUTURE
OF REGIONALISM IN AFRICA 12 (Ralph I. Onwuka & Amadu Sesay eds., 1985). But even as
the leaders advocated these noble ideals, they ran highly despotic police states and showed
little regard for the welfare and fundamental rights of those whom they governed. It is
difficult not to see their pious expressions of nationalism and patriotism as self-serving.
261. Id. at 6. The OAU has long been viewed by Africans as a club of dictators and,
with the exception of support for anti-colonial struggles on the continent, has throughout its
existence pursued a very narrow agenda. As Onwuka and Sesay note, the OAU was "estab-
lished to reflect and advance the interests of national leaderships on the continent" and "seeks
to achieve cooperation without further reducing sovereignty and to minimise conflict without
resolving fundamental issues." Id.
262. See GAMBARI, supra note 249, at 68; see generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., PAN
AFRICANISM AND EAST AFRICAN INTEGRATION (1965).
263. In colonial jargon, Kenya was a colony, a status that made it the first among
subordinates, while Uganda and Tanganyika were protectorate and trust territory, respectively.
This distinction meant that the economies of the last two were subjected to the interests of the
white settlers in Kenya. This arrangement resulted in "colonial non-industrialization, the
discouragement of an indigenous entrepreneurial class in East Africa, especially in Uganda
and Tanganyika, and the organization of sub-regional infrastructures which conspicuously
favored Kenya." GAMBARI, supra note 249, at 69.
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by the settlers in Kenya and organized for their benefit. This imbalance
of resources and uneven development came back to haunt the post-
independence EAC.
The divergent interests of nationalists in each of the three coun-
tries' and Tanganyika's independence in 1961 frustrated any attempts
to transform the High Commission into a federation which would have
become independent as one entity. Ultimately, the High Commission
was transformed into the East African Common Services Organization
(EASCO) with the agreement that inequalities between the three states
would be reduced. EASCO supposedly "produced the functional advan-
tages of federalism without involving commitment to federalism as a
principle or programme."' 65 Although the leaders of the three (now
independent) east African states met in 1963 and dedicated themselves
to a political federation, that vision died for good by the end of the year
as the states struggled over the "degree of centralization to be built into
the new federation," the desire by Uganda "to preserve its fragile inter-
nal unity," and its "fear of Kenyan control over regional institutions.'"
To avoid the collapse of EASCO, the three leaders met in 1964-65 and
concluded the Kampala/Mbale Agreements under which "measures were
to be taken designed to locate the expansion of existing industrial capac-
ity in Uganda and Tanzania but not in Kenya, and to 'allocate new
industries more equitably in the three territories."2 67 These agreements
failed partially because Kenya refused to ratify them. But unwilling to
terminate the common market in spite of these differences, the states
agreed to the Treaty for East African Cooperation in 1967, thereby
giving birth to the EAC.26
The treaty sought to create d customs union, increase intra-regional
trade, establish a common tariff, and set up a system for the transfer of
taxes.269 In addition, the EAC would administer joint services in rail-
ways, harbors, a regional airline [East African Airways], and posts and
264. Although Julius Nyerere of Tanzania favored an East African federation, indepen-
dence leaders in Kenya and Uganda preferred independence for their territories as sovereign
states. See D. Wadada Nabudere, The Role of Tanzania in Regional Integration in East Africa
- Old and New Patterns, in FOREIGN POLICY OF TANZANIA, supra note 239, at 126-32.
265. Brownlie, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 226, at 63.
266. See Allen L. Springer, Community Chronology, in INTEGRATION AND DISINTE-
GRATION IN EAST AFRICA 9, 16-17 (Christian P. Potholm & Richard A. Fredland eds., 1980).
267. GAMBARI, supra note 249, at 72.
268. Treaty for East African Co-operation, June 6, 1967, Kenya-Uganda-Tanz., 6 I.L.M.
932.
269. Id. art. 20.
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telecommunications.27 A regional bank, the East African Development
Bank, was established to balance the distribution of industrial develop-
ment in favor of Uganda and Tanzania.
27'
In 1976, in spite of this new elaborate scheme, the EAC collapsed,
barely a decade after its creation. Several reasons have been advanced
for the failure; most result from the clear advantages enjoyed by Kenya
over the others and the pressures exerted on the organization by ruling
elites whose interests were divergent from it. Gambari has noted that:
There were four main reasons for the collapse of the East African
community: the continuation of a pattern of industrial production
which reinforced a lopsided distribution of costs and benefits;
different patterns of ideological leaning, political system, and
socioeconomic orientation among member states; the treaty itself as
a problem area; and finally, nationalism, nationalistic pressures,
and interstate conflicts.272
In addition to these problems, other questions put more burdens on
the EAC: the military coup in Uganda which brought the vicious Idi
Amin to power; Tanzania's support for anti-Amin forces; Amin's claims
to part of Kenya's territory; Kenya's collaboration with Israeli command
forces in the Entebbe raid; Tanzania's support for liberation struggles in
southern Africa and Kenya's ambivalence to it; the global recession and
inflation; and, divide-and-penetrate strategies by international business
sealed the fate of the EAC.273
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has
not fared any better although, unlike its east African counterpart, it is
still in existence. Founded in Nigeria in 1975 by fifteen states274 in the
region, ECOWAS represented one of the more ambitious attempts at
regional economic cooperation. Patterned after the Treaty of Rome, the
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States seeks to
"promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activi-
ty ' '275 including industry, commerce, monetary policy, and agriculture. It
explicitly provides for the elimination of tariff and tariff barriers or the
270. Id. arts. 71-79.
271. Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra note 268, art. 22 & Annex VI;
GAMBARI, supra note 249, at 72-73.
272. Id. at 74-75.
273. Id. at 78-79; see generally Nabudere, supra note 264.
274. These are: Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta [now Burkina
Faso]. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), May 28,
1975, 10 U.N.T.S. 40.
275. Id. art. 2, para. I.
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creation of a customs union and the establishment of a common external
tariff.276 Like the EAC, the ECOWAS is inspired in large part by
functionalism.
There is little doubt that ECOWAS owes its origin to the regional
interests of Nigeria, the most dominant state in West Africa as well as
the most populous black country on earth.2' Due largely to its increased
oil wealth in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Nigeria became more
interested in playing a key role in the region. In addition to providing a
market for the goods of an increasingly industrializing Nigeria, a region-
al arrangement would make it more difficult for neighboring states to
interfere in its internal affairs, as two had done during the brutal
1967-70 civil war.278 Over the next two decades, this domination by one
country meant that the fortunes of ECOWAS would decline as Nigeria
was plunged into deeper political and economic crises.
The performance of ECOWAS has been extremely disappointing; it
has failed in virtually all its initial objectives.279 It has not made any
progress in its central objective: economic integration and policy harmo-
nization. The harmonization of industrial and fiscal policies, the creation
of a customs union, tariff coordination, and the establishment of external
tariffs remain a dream.280 Reasons for these failures include protective
national structures which were not created with the needs of a regional
market in mind, non-payment of membership contributions, the exis-
tence of smaller sub-regional groupings, the inability of ruling elites to
subordinate their interests to those of ECOWAS, French opposition and
the control over its satellites, particularly Senegal and the Ivory Coast,
276. Id. art. 2, paras. 2(a)-(c).
277. UKA EZENWE, ECOWAS AND THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF WEST AFRICA 15
(1983). In 1979, the population of Nigeria was put at over 82 million. Id. It is estimated today
that out of a population of 150 million in the region, more than 100 million are Nigerian. See
GAMBARI, supra note 249, at 46; S.K.B. Asante, Regional Economic Cooperation and
Integration: the Experience of ECOWAS, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 99, 103
(Anyang' Nyong'o ed., 1990).
278. Of the five states that recognized Biafra, two, Gabon and the Ivory Coast, were
West African. The others were Zambia, Tanzania, and Haiti. Ujalaye, supra note 118, at
553-54.
279. The one qualified "success" by ECOWAS has been its persistence through its force,
the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to restore
the collapsed Liberian state. Although it has not succeeded in ending the civil war and reunit-
ing the country, it has held together and spearheaded a number of ceasefires and plans for the
return of civil order. It is a remarkable achievement for an organization composed of states
which are at risk of collapse themselves. For a discussion of the Liberian crisis and the role
of ECOWAS, see Martin Lowenkopf, Liberia: Putting the State Back Together, in COL-
LAPSED STATES, supra note 117, at 91.
280. See Asante, supra note 277, at 111.
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and Nigeria's economic and political woes.28' But perhaps no other
reasons have been more destructive to integration than the instability,
including the collapse or failure of states in the region. While Liberia
has completely collapsed, Sierra Leone, Togo, Cameroon, Nigeria,
Gambia, and Burkina Faso have been in gradual decay for decades.
Others, such as Ghana, Benin, Mali, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Niger, and
Ghana are attempting to restore a measure of stability or reform after
decades of brutal despotic rule during which the functions of statehood
went unattended.
In eastern and southern Africa, two additional efforts at regional
cooperation have borne little fruit. The Preferential Trade Area (PTA)
for east and southern Africa is merely a forum for annual meetings in
which resolutions expressing hopes for future integration are passed. The
Southern Africa Development Council (SADC) holds out more hope
although the resolution of internal conflicts in Mozambique and Angola
and the legitimization of other regimes in the region are necessary
prerequisites for integration.282 The fundamental fact is that regional
integration has not worked in Africa because such an arrangement
assumes viable, legitimate, and functioning states, entities in which
ruling elites see a good greater than their own immediate control of the
state. It is unfair to expect collapsing or failing states to have such
transcendent interests. Although Senghor blames "nationalism" and the
recent acquisition of sovereignty for the failure of regionalism, he
nevertheless makes the same point when he writes that:
functionalism prescribes that in the process of integration "sover-
eign rights" are transferred from the state to the functional organi-
zations. Loyalties are transferred to these organizations because
they better satisfy individual needs. However, the reality is that
because most African countries acquired international sovereignty
only recently, political leaderships jealously guard their sovereignty
and are unwilling to reduce the power and authority of the state.
Instead, the common thrust of government action is towards pro-
moting national integration and consolidating national political
independence.283
281. See GAMBARI, supra note 249, at 32-48; Asante, supra note 277, at 108-25.
282. Ibbo Mandaza, SADCC: Problems of Regional, Political and Economic Cooperation
in Southern Africa, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA, supra note 277, at 141, 147; see
generally Herman J. Cohen, Can Southern Africa Become an Integrated Community?, 2
BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 189 (1995).
283. Jeggan C. Senghor, Theoretical Foundations for Regional Integration in Africa: An
Overview, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA, supra note 277, at 23, 25.
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If history had not shown otherwise, it might be possible to believe
that ruling elites mean well when they jealously hold on to power; these
were the same justifications advanced for one-party states and the end-
less cycle of military coups. The inability of the post-colonial state to
gain legitimacy and forge a nation reproduces an alienated elite whose
vision cannot see beyond the next day in office let alone across the
region. As an instrument for breathing new life into the state, regional-
ism is a dead end because it requires live states to operationalize.
CONCLUSION
Those who imposed the colonial state on Africa believed that they
were civilization's gift to the rest of humanity. Like the colonial state,
their views are not dead.2 Some have even suggested that Europe
should recolonize Africa,285 reasoning which assumes that it was a
mistake to decolonize Africa.286 Such views do not recognize that Eu-
rope's involvement in Africa has brought nothing but misery. Perhaps
the withdrawal of the West from Africa, though detrimental to the
colonial state, may provide an opportunity for Africans to squarely face
their problems for the first time in several centuries. In that re-examina-
tion of the continent, Africa would do well to abandon the principle of
uti possidetis juris, the device that falsely linked the decolonization of
the colonial state to the liberation of African peoples. It is a straight-
jacket which continues to deny freedom to millions of Africans. While
its rejection plunges Africa into an uncertain future, it ensures that
creative thinking at least begins to explore bold solutions to the crisis.
It would be irresponsible to assume that the direction proposed in
this article could not lead Africa down a more treacherous path in which
power-mongers and cynical ethnic chauvinists would senselessly tear
society apart in pursuit of self-aggrandizement. That possibility, which
would be a real setback to pan-Africanism, exists. But it is far more
damning to sit and wait for disaster to strike, precipitating the crises that
have been witnessed in Sorhalia, Liberia, and Rwanda. That is why
orderly formulae for re-making the continent's political map must be
worked out soon. Otherwise the post-colonial state, itself already a
284. See, e.g., Richard Dowden, A Map does not a Nation Make, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 9,
1995, at 15. Dowden crudely dismisses the suggestion that because the colonial state is the
primary reason for the continent's troubles that the map of Africa should be redrawn to
address this problem. He decries the rise of ethnic consciousness which he sees as a return to
Africa's chaotic past. He laments the failure of the colonial state. Id.
285. Pfaff, Africa Needs Europe, supra note 19.
286. Pfaff, A New Colonialism, supra note 19.
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terrorist organization masquerading as the repository of popular will,
will fragment into pieces and provide devious outsiders with more
opportunities to literally pick Africa apart. Among the problems that will
have to be addressed by Africans as they ponder this proposal are the
criteria for determining the "self' who would possess the right to self-
determination and how the will of that self would be determined. Identi-
fying these criteria will be especially difficult because the colonial state
substantially changed social relations and created new alliances and
interests not in existence in the pre-colonial era. All these variables will
have to taken into account as new fora for expressing popular will, such
as plebiscites and referenda, are explored as possible avenues for deter-
mining a new African political map.
